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MDL IN THE STATES
Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave
ABSTRACT—Multidistrict litigation (MDL) is exploding. MDL makes up a
large and increasing portion of the federal civil docket. It has been used in
recent years to manage and resolve some of our largest controversies:
opioids, NFL concussions, Volkswagen “clean” diesel, and many more.
And, given its growing importance, MDL has come to dominate the
academic literature on complex litigation.
At its base, MDL is a tool to coordinate related cases across different
courts in service of justice, efficiency, and fairness. These goals are not
unique to the federal courts. State courts handle far more cases than federal
courts, including the kinds of complex disputes that could benefit from
coordination. Yet state MDL procedures are virtually absent from the
scholarly literature.
This Article offers a systematic study of state MDLs. Surveying the
laws of every state, we find that about half the states have developed their
own MDL-like procedural devices. What makes MDL distinctive is that it
allows some official or institution to consolidate cases and to assign them to
a handpicked judge. Therefore, we develop in this Article the first taxonomy
of state MDL mechanisms based on which officials or institutions are given
this substantial power. Along the way, we explore the other ways that states
have tailored their MDL rules. We also provide case studies of three state
MDL systems and report previously unpublished data on how state MDLs
work.
Building on these findings, this Article offers an institutional analysis
of state MDL. We find that state MDLs distribute important cases to courts
and judges in ways that depart dramatically from the default rules of judicial
administration. These choices have important consequences for litigant
control, judicial power, and both inter- and intrastate relations, which can be
amplified in states where judges are elected. In these ways, different types
of state MDLs—sometimes unwittingly—may tilt the usual balance in favor
of plaintiffs or defendants, local actors or statewide ones, and voters or
government officials.
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George A. Butler Research Professor and Associate Professor of Law,
1649

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

University of Houston Law Center. For helpful comments and conversations,
we would like to thank Lori Andrus, Lynn Baker, Emily Berman, Bob Bone,
Pam Bookman, Beth Burch, Sarah Crooks, David Dow, Dave Fagundes,
Brian Fitzpatrick, Robert Freedman, Abbe Gluck, Maria Glover, Steve
Herman, Lonny Hoffman, Sam Issacharoff, Olatunde Johnson, Carolyn
Kuhl, David Kwok, Alexandra Lahav, Steve Landsman, Dave Marcus,
Altom Maglio, James Nelson, Ellen Relkin, Judith Resnik, Jessica Roberts,
Joe Sanders, Dave Schwartz, Gerson Smoger, David Sugarman, Irene Ten
Cate, Diego Zambrano, and participants in the AALS Annual Meeting Civil
Procedure Section, the Civil Procedure Workshop, the SEALS Civil
Procedure Discussion Group, the Clifford Symposium, and the Pound Civil
Justice Institute’s Academic Symposium. Research Librarians Ashley
Arrington and Katy Badeaux provided invaluable assistance tracking down
primary sources, and Haley Martin and Douglas Wagner provided helpful
research assistance.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1651
I.

TAXONOMY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN ........................................................... 1656
A. Taxonomy ................................................................................................. 1657
B. Institutional Design of State MDL Systems ............................................... 1663
C. Consolidation Rules .................................................................................. 1669
D. Management ............................................................................................. 1671
E. Source of Law ........................................................................................... 1675
F. A Brief Comment on Variation ................................................................. 1676

II.

CASE STUDIES ................................................................................................... 1676
A. California ................................................................................................. 1677
B. Texas ......................................................................................................... 1686
C. Indiana...................................................................................................... 1693
D. Other States .............................................................................................. 1697

III. ASSESSMENT...................................................................................................... 1699
A. Interstate Political Economy?................................................................... 1700
B. Intrastate Forum Shopping ....................................................................... 1703
C. Intrastate Judicial Politics ........................................................................ 1707
D. Federal–State Competition ....................................................................... 1712
E. Interjurisdictional Cooperation ................................................................ 1714
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 1718
APPENDIX A: STATE MDL RULES, STATUTES, AND STANDARDS ................................ 1719
APPENDIX B: CALIFORNIA COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS DATA.................................. 1728
APPENDIX C: TEXAS MDL DATA ............................................................................... 1732

1650

115:1649 (2021)

MDL in the States

INTRODUCTION
Imagine a major storm causes damage to thousands of homes. As is
often the case, a wave of insurance litigation follows in its wake.
Homeowners file hundreds of cases in dozens of courts alleging that
insurance companies relied on unlawful procedures when denying or
reducing insurance claims. There could be many advantages to coordinating
this mass of cases, especially if there is a good chance that they will be
resolved together in a global settlement. At the very least, duplicative
discovery and inconsistent judgments could be avoided if the cases could be
consolidated in front of a single judge. But which judge? And how is that
judge selected?
As every lawyer knows, the answers to these questions matter
tremendously. Judges vary along many important dimensions. Some judges
are active case managers; others let the parties run the show. Some are pushy
about settling cases; others love taking cases to trial. Some are plaintifffriendly; others sympathize with defendants. And because so much mass
litigation ends in settlement, most of their decisions will never be subject to
meaningful appellate review.
In federal courts, related cases like these can be consolidated in a
multidistrict litigation (MDL). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML), a panel of seven federal judges selected by the Chief Justice of the
United States, is authorized to consolidate cases and transfer them to a single
handpicked judge for coordinated pretrial proceedings.1 MDL has come to
dominate the federal civil docket, and it has been used to manage and resolve
some of our largest controversies, such as the BP oil-spill disaster, the NFL
concussion litigation, and the Volkswagen “clean”-diesel scandal.2 The
federal MDL process is well studied and well understood.3 And, perhaps
1

See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), (d).
By some (potentially misleading) estimates, MDL accounts for nearly 50% of the entire federal
civil docket. See Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297, 1305, 1314–16
(2020) [hereinafter Clopton, MDL as Category] (citing sources and questioning this statistic). For more
rigorous estimates, see generally Margaret S. Williams, The Effect of Multidistrict Litigation on the
Federal Judiciary over the Past 50 Years, 53 GA. L. REV. 1245 (2019). For an excellent history of the
MDL statute and overview of the procedure, see generally Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The
Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017).
3
Because federal MDL is well-studied and well-understood, there are too many sources to cite here.
For a selection of recent articles that informed this project, see, for example, Lynn A. Baker & Stephen
J. Herman, Layers of Lawyers: Parsing the Complexities of Claimant Representation in Mass Tort MDLs,
24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 469 (2020); Bradt, supra note 2; Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The
Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2017)
[hereinafter Bradt & Rave, The Information-Forcing Role]; Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s
Good to Have the “Haves” on Your Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation,
2
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surprisingly given the stakes of some of these controversies, the best
evidence so far suggests that the consolidation process operates in a largely
nonpartisan way.4 Thus, the federal courts have rather successfully
formalized the consolidation of related cases from around the country.
But what if these same cases were pending in state courts or were
divided up between federal and state courts? State courts handle more than
sixty times as many cases as federal courts, including the types of mass
disputes that could benefit from coordination.5 Yet the various ways that
states handle MDL-like litigation have been virtually absent from the
scholarly literature.6
This lack of attention is not because states simply mirror the federal
courts. Many state MDL procedures differ dramatically from federal MDL
procedures and from each other. And these differences can be magnified
because, in many states, judges are elected to represent local or statewide
constituencies. So, in addition to all the ways that any two MDL judges may
differ, state MDLs also interact with electoral politics. Some of the elected

108 GEO. L.J. 73 (2019) [hereinafter Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves”]; ELIZABETH
CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2019)
[hereinafter BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017) [hereinafter Burch, Monopolies]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch &
Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. 1445 (2017); Zachary D. Clopton & Andrew D. Bradt, Party Preferences in Multidistrict Litigation,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1713 (2019) [hereinafter Clopton & Bradt, Party Preferences]; Abbe R. Gluck,
Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of
Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669 (2017); Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of
Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511 (2013); Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests:
From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the
Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2017); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-class
Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107
(2010); Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The
Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424 (2013).
4
See Andrew D. Bradt & Zachary D. Clopton, MDL v. Trump: The Puzzle of Public Law in
Multidistrict Litigation, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 905, 925–27 (2018) [hereinafter Bradt & Clopton, MDL v.
Trump].
5
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE: THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN
STATE COURTS 6 n.36 (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/_data/assets/pdf_file/0020/13376/civiljusticerepot2015.pdf [perma.cc/RG2S-45E4] (first citing NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2015); and then citing Table C. U.S.
District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods
Ending December 31, 2013 and 2014, U.S. CTS. https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/c00dec14.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5N4K-STQ3]).
6
The best existing treatment of state MDL procedures is a seventeen-year-old treatise that is out of
print: MARK HERRMANN, GEOFFREY J. RITTS & KATHERINE LARSON, STATEWIDE COORDINATED
PROCEEDINGS: STATE COURT ANALOGUES TO THE FEDERAL MDL PROCESS (2d ed. 2004). We cite the
handful of other exceptions focusing on one state or another in Parts II and III, infra.
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state judges will be Democrats, others Republicans. Some will have to cater
to big-city voters, others to rural constituents. Some will have received
sizeable campaign contributions from plaintiffs’ lawyers, others from big
businesses, including insurance companies. Again, it matters greatly which
judge manages the consolidated proceeding and how that judge is selected.
To be more concrete, imagine the insurance cases from the hypothetical
storm were pending in Texas state courts. Indeed, this situation is based on
a real set of Texas state cases.7 Texas has an MDL statute that would allow
these cases to be brought together for coordinated proceedings.8 The power
to consolidate, and with it the power to assign the consolidated cases to a
particular judge, is vested in a panel of judges appointed by the state’s elected
chief justice. The Texas chief justice has been a Republican—and has
appointed a Republican-majority panel—for the entire existence of Texas
MDL.9 It goes without saying that empowering a statewide panel of elected
judges to reallocate important cases from one locally elected trial judge to
another has significant consequences for litigants, voters, and intrastate
relations.10
Had the same events happened in Indiana, however, they would have
played out differently than in Texas or the federal courts. In Indiana, the
decision whether to consolidate related cases is vested in the locally elected
trial judge with whom the first of the cases was filed.11 Litigants presumably
respond to this design strategically. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, if given the
opportunity, might choose to file their first case in front of the most plaintifffriendly judge, perhaps one elected from a heavily Democratic corner of the
state. That judge could then vacuum up cases from across the state—even if
the vast majority of the related lawsuits were filed in front of judges elected
by very different constituencies. Thus, the Indiana version of this story
implicates the horizontal distribution of power among locally elected judges,
instead of the vertical distribution between state and local actors. Again, the
consequences for litigants, voters, and intrastate relations are significant.
In Texas, Indiana, and every other state with an MDL system, these
consequential departures from the usual rules of venue and case assignment
have played out with relatively little scrutiny or critical analysis because
7

See In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig., 481 S.W.3d 422 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2015).
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.161 et seq. (West 2019); TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.
9
See infra Section II.B.
10
We have more to say about Texas MDL infra Section II.B and in D. Theodore Rave & Zachary
D. Clopton, Texas MDL, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367 (2020) [hereinafter Rave & Clopton, Texas
MDL].
11
IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D).
8
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scholars have not been paying attention. This Article aims to change that by
undertaking a comprehensive study of state MDL systems. Approximately
half the states—including those with the largest legal markets—have some
sort of MDL procedure that gives some judge or judges the power to
consolidate and assign many of the state’s most important cases.12 We aim to
unmask these processes and explore the consequences and tradeoffs they
entail.
Our descriptive contribution starts with a detailed survey of MDL
practice in the states. We bring together state statutes and rules, interviews
with judges and rulemakers, unpublished judicial records and committee
deliberations, and our analysis of published and unpublished state judicial
data. In Part I, we examine the variety of institutional-design choices that
states have made and develop the first taxonomy of state MDL systems.
More specifically, we divide states into four categories: those with (1) an
“institutional” model in which some centralized institution other than a trial
judge (such as a panel or the state supreme court) is empowered to
consolidate cases, (2) a “peer” model in which trial judges with pending
cases are empowered to consolidate cases from other peer judges around the
state, (3) “ad hoc” approaches to certain mass litigations, and (4) no MDL
procedures. Our institutional analysis turns on the central question of who
decides whether and in front of which judge cases should be consolidated,
though we also catalog in the main text and in the Appendices various other
MDL issues on which states have made different choices.
To gain a better understanding of how state MDLs work on the ground,
in Part II we offer case studies of the MDL systems of two institutional states
(California and Texas) and one peer state (Indiana) that vary on multiple
dimensions. We examine the history and design of these states’ MDL
systems, and we report new data on how frequently the procedures are used,
in which types of cases, and on the diversity of judges selected. We also
report in Part II previously unpublished data about the extent of
consolidation in the other states with MDL procedures. We find that state
MDLs handle a substantial number of cases of national importance in
parallel—and often in cooperation—with federal MDLs, mostly related to
products liability. But we also find that state MDLs more frequently handle
cases of statewide importance, across a wide range of subject matters, for
which federal jurisdiction is likely unavailable. In other words, while state
MDLs offer opportunities for federal–state cooperation, they are more than
mere adjuncts to the federal MDL system.

12
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We draw on this descriptive work to develop an institutional analysis in
Part III. First, we consider but ultimately reject the idea that state MDLs are
a locus of interstate competition. The limits of state jurisdiction, and, perhaps
more importantly, the goliath of federal MDL, mean that states are unlikely
to use MDL procedures to compete with each other for judicial business.
But this is not to say that political economy is irrelevant. Our second
observation is that intrastate political economy—the competition between
plaintiff- and defense-side interests—has implications for state MDL design
choices. For example, the decision to empower trial judges versus external
institutions to consolidate cases has significant consequences for the ability
of parties to shop for their preferred forums and judges, which in turn shifts
the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants within the state.
Empowering external institutions tends to blunt plaintiffs’ ability to forum
shop to the benefit of defense-side interests, while empowering peer trial
judges creates opportunities for plaintiffs to exert greater control over which
courts and judges will hear their cases.
Our third observation links this analysis to two other aspects of state
judiciaries: how judges are selected (elected versus appointed) and what
constituencies they represent (local versus statewide). Analyzing state MDLs
in light of state judicial selection emphasizes the stakes for the allocation of
judicial authority within the states, and sometimes for the will of the people
expressed in judicial elections. For example, allowing a chief justice who
was elected statewide to reassign cases from one locally elected trial judge
(say in a conservative county) to another (say in a liberal county) has obvious
consequences for the division of authority within the state and for the
legitimacy of the judge’s ultimate decision. This is not to say that any
particular combination of MDL procedure and judicial selection is right or
wrong. Different states might reasonably make different choices about how
to allocate judicial power and which values to prioritize in mass litigation.
But it does mean that state MDL design interacts with fundamental questions
of government power and democratic legitimacy. And it is not always clear
that the designers of state MDL systems, who typically talk in terms of
judicial administration, have fully thought through the implications of their
design choices on these issues.
Fourth, although we find no evidence that states adopted their MDL
procedures in order to affect federal MDLs, the design of state MDLs has
implications for complex disputes pending in both state and federal courts.
A frequent objection to federal MDL is that it supposedly empowers a
handful of plaintiffs’ lawyers who may not represent the interests of all
plaintiffs. The presence of parallel state MDLs headed by different—but also
powerful—plaintiffs’ lawyers may serve a checking function against the
1655
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federal lead counsel, just as states might do in a federal system. The potential
for state MDLs to reduce agency costs through this form of federal–state
competition comes at some cost to collective action, so we do not suggest
that state MDLs are always positive additions to a nationwide dispute. But
they have the capacity to substantially change litigation dynamics in ways
that cannot be ignored.
Fifth and finally, we return to issues of interstate relations to consider
how state MDLs affect interjurisdictional cooperation. For one thing, the
variation in state MDL procedures creates the opportunity for learning
among policymakers and MDL judges—and, indeed, even since beginning
this project, we have been contacted by multiple states seeking to use our
results to help design their own state MDL systems.13 State MDLs also create
opportunities for cooperation on actual cases. Particularly when nationwide
disputes are chopped up into state and federal court components, we find that
state MDLs offer potential forums for judicial cooperation. To take just one
high-profile example, in the litigation surrounding the opioid crisis, there are
nine state MDLs working in cooperation with the federal MDL proceeding.14
Looking forward, we suggest that the presence of concurrent litigation
should often cut in favor of state-level consolidation.
In sum, this Article shows that the complex-litigation landscape
consists of more than just federal MDL. State courts play an important role
in resolving complex disputes. We find that states are adapting to that role
by designing their own systems for coordination and management. And
while this study does not permit us to identify the ideal state MDL system, it
does demonstrate that state MDL choices have important consequences for
litigants, courts, and voters.
I.

TAXONOMY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

To better understand the landscape of state MDLs, in this Part we
survey the laws of all fifty states, creating the first taxonomy of state MDL
systems. We then survey how MDL states handle important institutionaldesign questions related to consolidation, assignment, and case management.
Our results, which build on a practitioner treatise compiled more than a
13

We have received such inquiries from representatives of Florida and Ohio, two large states without
MDL procedures.
14
See generally Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, DEPAUL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6–8) https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3680074
[https://perma.cc/Z5EQ-S8RK] [hereinafter Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs] (discussing
cases in New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Texas, South Carolina, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and California).
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decade ago,15 reveal wide variation among the states in the designs of their
MDL systems.
Before diving in, though, there is an important scope question to be
answered: What are state MDLs? Taking a cue from the federal statute, we
are not focused on any particular case type (e.g., mass torts).16 Instead, we
are looking for special mechanisms that depart from the ordinary venue or
venue-transfer rules to allow for consolidation or coordination of cases
across different courts within a single state. Provisions that allow for the
transfer of cases to other proper venues (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404) or the
consolidation of issues or cases pending within a single court (e.g., Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 42), therefore, would not qualify as “state MDLs.”17
A. Taxonomy
The first step in our project is to create a taxonomy of state MDLs.
Although there are many ways to divide the universe, we settled on four
broad categories: (1) states that rely on institutions outside of the trial courts
to decide whether and where to consolidate cases (institutional MDL);
(2) states that rely on trial judges with pending cases to decide whether to
consolidate cases from other trial judges (peer MDL); (3) states that have a
history of ad hoc consolidation (ad hoc MDL); and (4) states that do not
appear to have any mechanism for MDL-like consolidation. As explained in
Part III, these simple divisions have major consequences for how state MDLs
affect important values.
The results of our taxonomy are reproduced in Table 1 and displayed
geographically in Figure 1.18 The balance of this Section will say a bit more

15

See generally HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 6 (surveying existing state MDL procedures).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407; Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1316–17 (discussing federal
MDL case types). For this reason, although interesting, we are not focused here on special state rules for
complex or other subcategories of cases that might overlap with MDL but that do not involve the
consolidation of cases across courts. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (dividing cases into tiers, with Tier 3
being most complex); CAL. R. CT. 3.400–3.402; Special Sessions of the Superior Court, CONN. JUD.
BRANCH, https://jud.ct.gov/external/super/spsess.htm#ComplexLitigationDocket [https://perma.cc/
CVT8-MUZR] (outlining Connecticut’s “Complex Litigation Docket”); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.201 (outlining
Florida’s “Complex Litigation” rule); 231 PA. CODE R. 1041.1 (detailing Pennsylvania’s special
provisions for asbestos cases). Nor are we interested here in the fact that the Montana legislature, by
statute, created a special asbestos claims court. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-20-101 (2019).
17
We acknowledge that the label “MDL” may be technically inaccurate for states that do not divide
their courts into “districts.” But because MDL comes with many connotations that help contextualize our
analysis, we use the label despite its technical inaccuracy for some states.
18
The map was produced using “United States of America with States – Blue” by
FreeVectorMaps.com. Map of the United States of America with States – Blue, FREE VECTOR MAPS,
https://freevectormaps.com/united-states/US-EPS-02-4002?ref=search_result [https://perma.cc/VE675GMW].
16
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about each of our categories and how we resolved close cases. Additional
information and citations to relevant sources are included in Appendix A.
TABLE 1: STATE MDL TAXONOMY

Institutional
MDL
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Illinois
Kansas
Minnesota
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Oregon
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
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Peer MDL

Ad Hoc MDL

Indiana
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Wisconsin

Michigan
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Tennessee

No MDL
Analogy
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
South Dakota
Utah
Vermont
Washington
Wyoming
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FIGURE 1: STATE MDL TAXONOMY

1. Institutional MDL
Our first category comprises those states with institutional MDL
procedures. What distinguishes these states is that they rely on some
institution independent of trial judges to decide whether to consolidate or
coordinate cases pending in different courts and to decide which trial judge
should handle those cases. Institutional MDL systems may rely on a
dedicated panel for multidistrict litigation, the state’s highest court, or the
state’s chief justice to make the consolidation decision.
Thirteen states have adopted institutional MDL procedures: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.19 We describe
in more detail the particulars of these states’ procedures below.20
Including Connecticut in this category was a close call because it has a
hybrid MDL procedure. Connecticut law permits related cases to be
transferred by the trial judges, by party consent, or by the chief court
administrator (appointed by the chief justice).21 The ability of a trial judge
with pending cases to transfer them for consolidated proceedings would
19
See infra Table A1. Oregon’s MDL procedure, however, is limited to class actions pending in
different courts. OR. R. CIV. P. 32(K).
20
See infra Section I.B.
21
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-347b (2019).
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place Connecticut in the peer category. But we have chosen to include
Connecticut in the institutional category because of the option to rely on
another judicial actor—here the chief court administrator—to transfer cases
without a trial judge’s approval.
2. Peer MDL
Our second category comprises states that authorize state trial judges as
trial judges—not as panel members, as in the federal and some state
systems—to consolidate cases across judicial districts. Seven states fit this
description: Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.22
Peer MDL models also vary. In some states, the judge in the earliest
filed action can order cases filed around the state to be transferred and
consolidated in that court. In other states, any judge with a pending case can
decide on consolidation and transfer. Still other states require the
concurrence of both the transferor and transferee judges to effect a
consolidation. We describe these different models below,23 but they all share
the salient feature of assigning consolidation responsibility to trial judges
with pending cases.
3. Ad Hoc MDL
Our third category comprises four states that have engaged in ad hoc
MDL-like procedures: Michigan, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Tennessee.24
In Michigan, the supreme court ordered consolidation of mass litigation
on at least two occasions: breast-implant cases in 1993 and antitrust cases
against Microsoft in 2000.25 Both times, the Michigan Supreme Court issued
detailed orders that specified many aspects of the consolidated proceedings,

22
See infra Table A1. A close call here is Maryland. Maryland has a special rule that allows trial
judges to transfer cases with common questions of law or fact across judicial circuits, but ultimately we
do not think it belongs in the peer MDL category. MD. R. CIV. P. 2-327(d). The reason is that the rule
specifies that the transferor judge may transfer a case only to a court in which the case could have been
brought. In other words, it works like a typical venue transfer, and the normal rules of venue apply.
(Technically, the rule requires that circuit administrative judges approve the transfer as well, but, unlike
Connecticut, that does not displace the role of the transferor judge.)
23
See infra Section I.B.2.
24
See infra Table A1.
25
See In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., Admin. Order No. 2000-5 (Mich. 2000) & In re Silicone Gel
Implant
Prod.
Liab.
Litig.,
Admin.
Order
No.
1993-2
(Mich.
1993),
https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/rules/Documents/Administrative%20Orders
.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8WK-8F7V].
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but without any MDL-specific rule or statute.26 The Michigan Supreme Court
considered, but ultimately rejected, similar consolidation of asbestos cases.27
In Oklahoma, the supreme court ordered the consolidation of state
breast-implant litigation in 1993, relying on its “general supervisory and
administrative powers” under the Oklahoma constitution.28 Since then, the
court has relied on these powers to consolidate other cases on an ad hoc basis,
but there is no rule or statute governing its decisions.29
The Supreme Court of South Carolina also consolidated state breastimplant litigation for pretrial proceedings only.30
The fourth state in this category is Tennessee. Unlike the previous three,
what makes Tennessee ad hoc is that it has a consolidation procedure only
in the local rules of one of its districts. The Local Rules of Practice for Shelby
County provide that, upon motion, all of the judges of the court can sit
together to decide whether consolidation is appropriate.31 Such consolidation
is permitted even for cases in multiple divisions within the district. We
include Tennessee among the ad hoc states because this local rule shows that
statewide authorities have essentially left MDL up to the local courts—a
different sense of ad hoc.

26

See id. Interestingly, the procedures for these two ad hoc consolidations differed in significant
ways. For example, the breast-implant cases were consolidated for pretrial purposes only, while the
Microsoft cases were consolidated for all purposes, including trial. Id.
27
Prohibition on “Bundling” Cases, Admin. Order No. 2006-6 (Mich. 2006), https://www.icle.org/
contentfiles/milawnews/Rules/Ao/2003-47_08-09-06_unformatted-order.html [https://perma.cc/BRZ29J3R]. The court explained:
[T]he Court has determined that trial courts should be precluded from “bundling” asbestos-related
cases for settlement or trial. It is the opinion of the Court that each case should be decided on its
own merits, and not in conjunction with other cases. Thus, no asbestos-related disease personal
injury action shall be joined with any other such case for settlement or for any other purpose, with
the exception of discovery.
Id. In considering consolidation, the court drafted a proposed order that built on elements of the two prior
consolidations. See Proposed Admin. Order Regarding Asbestos-Related Disease Litig., ADM File No.
2003-47 (Mich. 2006), https://www.icle.org/contentfiles/milawnews/Rules/Ao/2003-47_02-2306_unformatted-order.html [https://perma.cc/DX8Y-KN6Y].
28
In re Okla. Breast Implant Cases, 847 P.2d 772, 772–73 (1993).
29
See HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 447 (explaining this dynamic and citing examples of cases
consolidated under this constitutionally derived authority).
30
See In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 503 S.E.2d 445, 446 (S.C. 1998); see also HERRMANN
ET AL., supra note 6, at 515 (noting this example). We are not aware of other consolidation orders of this
kind in South Carolina.
31
SHELBY CNTY., TENN., THIRTIETH JUD. DIST. AT MEMPHIS, LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE r. 28
(2012), https://www.shelbycountytn.gov/DocumentCenter/View/413/rules_of_the_court?bidId= [https://
perma.cc/6E98-5AC8].

1661

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Note that, although we feel relatively comfortable with our list of
institutional and peer states (having scoured state statutes and court rules)
and the four states we have identified here, we are less sure that we have
identified all the states that have, at some point, engaged in ad hoc
consolidation. Such is the nature of ad hockery.32
4. No MDL Analogy
Twenty-six states appear to have no special MDL-like procedures.33
Ordinary venue transfers are, of course, possible in these states. These states
also typically allow the consolidation of different cases pending in a single
court, and some even have special procedures for handling certain types of
cases (e.g., asbestos litigation).34 But we have found no statutory or rulesbased mechanisms for consolidating or coordinating cases across venues in
these states.
5. The Road Not Taken
Finally, we would be remiss for not mentioning here that at least two
states considered adopting MDL procedures but declined.
In 2007, the chief justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court established
what came to be called the Mass Tort and Class Action Litigation
Committee.35 In its 2010 Final Report, the Committee explained that it had
considered but declined to pursue a special MDL-like procedure for complex
cases. The Committee wrote: “While Kentucky has many jurisdictions, the
relative infrequency of cases spanning multiple circuits renders multi-district
litigation rules unnecessary.”36
Around the same time, Ohio began to consider an MDL rule at the
behest of Mark Herrmann,37 author of the leading practitioner treatise on state
MDLs. Herrmann’s 2007 suggestion led to a 2014 memorandum prepared
32

See generally Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767,
767 (2017) (describing the general practice of ad hoc procedure making).
33
The states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. See infra Table A1.
34
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3-20-102, 3-20-103 (2019) (creating special asbestos claim court);
ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (dividing cases into tiers, with Tier 3 being most complex).
35
See KY. SUP. CT., MASS TORT AND CLASS ACTION LITIGATION COMMITTEE: FINAL REPORT 3
(2010),
https://courts.ky.gov/resources/publicationsresources/Publications/MassTortandClassAction
LitigationCommitteeFinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YPK-ZMXA].
36
Id. at 4.
37
See SUP. CT. OF OHIO, MEMORANDUM RE: RECOMMENDATION FOR A MULTI-DISTRICT
LITIGATION PROGRAM (2014); SUP. CT. OF OHIO, ADVISORY COMM. ON CASE MGMT., MEETING
MINUTES (2014); SUP CT. OF OHIO, MEMORANDUM RE: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CASE MANAGEMENT
2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2015).
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for the state’s Advisory Committee on Case Management. A subcommittee
recommended the creation of an MDL rule, but the full committee ultimately
did not adopt that recommendation.38 While there remains some interest for
pursuing this sort of rule reform in Ohio, the issue is not presently on the
Committee’s agenda.
B. Institutional Design of State MDL Systems
The previous Section created a taxonomy of states based on the
structure of their MDL systems. But our general labels do not tell the entire
story. The choice between vesting the consolidation decision in a centralized
institution versus in a trial judge has important consequences for how these
systems interact with party choice and judicial power. Within the
institutional and peer MDL categories, we find significant differences in the
ways that these states allocate institutional or peer control. We describe those
differences here and summarize them in Table 2 at the end of this Section.39
These choices connect not only with MDL design but also with questions of
judicial selection. We, therefore, also report in this Section (and discuss in
detail in Part III) the methods of selecting judges in the states.40
1. Institutional States
Within our institutional MDL category, different states authorize
different institutions to decide whether and where to transfer and consolidate
cases. The three primary approaches are (1) a dedicated MDL panel, (2) the

38

See supra note 37.
In addition to citations to particular provisions, we provide citations to all of the relevant statutes
and rules in Table A1 infra.
40
There is, of course, far more to say about judicial selection (and its connection to case outcomes)
than we can say here. For just a few examples addressing these issues, see HERBERT M. KRITZER,
JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015)
(reporting on the historical patterns of state supreme court elections and analyzing the reasons behind the
changes in the methods); Herbert M. Kritzer, Judicial Elections in the 2010s, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 387
(2018) (updating the analysis in Justices on the Ballot with data from 2013 through 2016 elections); Adam
Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan
Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selection, 60 J.L. & ECON. 559 (2017) (exploring how
ideology influences the selection of judges); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ideological Consequences of
Selection: A Nationwide Study of the Methods of Selecting Judges, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1732 (2017)
(assessing whether “certain methods of selection have resulted in judiciaries that skew to the left or right
compared with the public at large in those states”); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics,
Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 119 MICH. L. REV. 231, 233 (2020)
(exploring “the relationship between the ideology, gender, and race of U.S. Court of Appeals judges and
decisions addressing class certification”).
39
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state’s highest court, and (3) the state’s chief justice. Here we catalog some
additional variations in how these institutions are composed and selected.41
a. Dedicated panel
One of the most distinctive features of the federal MDL statute is its
reliance on a panel of judges to consolidate, transfer, and assign MDLs.42 For
that reason, we start our inquiry with states that use panels.
Five states rely on a specialized MDL panel to consolidate cases:
Colorado, New York, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.43 Three of these
states, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, also authorize the panel to assign
consolidated cases to specific judges, as in the federal system. 44 In New York,
the panel decides where to send consolidated cases, but the administrative
judge of the selected transferee court assigns the cases to a particular judge.45
In Colorado, the panel has the power to make recommendations to the chief
justice, who makes the ultimate decision on which judge will hear the
consolidated cases.46
Panel design in these states varies on multiple dimensions. One such
dimension is panel selection. In the federal system, the Chief Justice alone
selects panel members.47 Because all federal judges are appointed, and
because an appointed Chief Justice selects the panel members, the federal
Panel has a double layer of insulation from electoral politics. But state
models of judicial selection vary considerably. No state MDL panels are
directly elected, providing at least one layer of insulation, but some panels
are chosen by, and composed of, elected judges.

41
Here, as elsewhere, we rely on the formal allocation of decisional authority. It is possible, for
example, that when a state authorizes the supreme court to decide on consolidation, in practice the chief
justice makes the decision. But for our purposes, such a state would be described as one in which the
supreme court decides.
42
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
43
See infra Table A1.
44
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (“[C]oordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted
by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation.”);
infra notes 198–211 and accompanying text (discussing Texas’s MDL procedure, including the MDL
panel’s assignment powers); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.4 (2020) (providing that Virginia’s MDL panel
“may order some or all of the actions transferred to a circuit court in which one or more of the actions are
pending for purposes of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings”); W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.05(c)
(permitting the MDL panel to “request the assignment by the Chief Justice of additional active or senior
status circuit court judges to assist the Panel in resolving Mass Litigation or proceedings therein as
needed”).
45
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.69(b)(2), (c)(1) (2020).
46
See COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(a)(1), (h); Beckord v. Dist. Ct., 698 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Colo. 1985).
47
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).
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Colorado and Texas rely on their chief justices alone to select panel
members.48 The Colorado chief justice is appointed and subject to retention
elections; the Texas chief justice is elected in partisan elections.49 In West
Virginia, the chief justice selects the panel, subject to approval by the
supreme court.50 All justices of the West Virginia supreme court are elected
in nonpartisan elections. In New York, the panel is selected by the chief
administrator of the courts for the state,51 who is an administrative officer
appointed by the chief judge of New York’s highest court with advice and
consent of an administrative board.52 The New York chief judge is, in turn,
appointed by the governor.53 Finally, in Virginia, the supreme court selects
panel members. Virginia supreme court justices are selected by the state
legislature.54 Interestingly, the Virginia supreme court appoints a new panel
for every consolidation decision.55 Thus, New York, Colorado, and Virginia
emulate the federal courts’ model of double insulation, while Texas and West
Virginia are not as far removed from electoral politics.
A second way in which states vary is in panel membership. In the
federal system, the panel is comprised of seven judges from district and
circuit courts, no two of whom may be from the same circuit.56 At the state
level, there is substantial variation in the size of the panel, the types of judges
eligible to serve, and whether geographic diversity is required. More
specifically, according to the rules or statutes in these panel states:

48

COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(a)(1); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.161(a) (West 2019).
Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State Courts.
Judicial Selection in the States, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us
[https://perma.cc/2RT5-KJNC]. There are three basic models of judicial elections: (1) partisan elections,
in which candidates run as nominees of a political party; (2) nonpartisan elections, in which candidates’
political affiliation does not appear on the ballot; and (3) retention elections, in which judges who were
initially appointed face no opponent but must garner a certain percentage of the votes to retain their
offices. See Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial Independence and
Retention Elections, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 211, 211–12 (2010).
50
W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.02.
51
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.69(b)(1) (2020).
52
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 210(3) (McKinney 2020).
53
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49.
54
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.4 (2020).
55
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.4(A) (2020) (stating that, when appropriate, “any party may apply
to a panel of circuit court judges designated by the Supreme Court for an order of transfer”).
56
28 U.S.C. § 1407(d). Today, the panel is made up of seven district judges. Historically, about 85%
of panel judges have been district judges. See Roster of Current and Former Judges of the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG.,
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Panel%20Judges%20Roster-10-16-2018_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8F62-46QR].
49
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Colorado’s panel includes “not less than three nor more than
seven district judges . . . no two of whom shall be from the
same judicial district.”57
New York’s panel must include one justice from the supreme
court of each judicial department.58 (New York’s supreme court
is its trial court of general jurisdiction.)59
Texas’s panel is made up of active appellate judges or
administrative judges.60
Virginia’s panels are made up of trial judges selected for each
consolidation decision.61
West Virginia’s panel is made up of seven active or senior trial
judges, appointed to three-year terms on a rotating basis with a
new chair every year.62

b. Highest court
In Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, and Oregon, the state’s highest court
makes the decision whether to consolidate and transfer related cases.63 In
Kansas, Illinois, and New Jersey, the high court also chooses the transferee
judge. In Oregon, the chief justice alone chooses the transferee judge.64
Illinois and Oregon elect their supreme court justices. In Kansas and New
Jersey, they are appointed.65
c. Chief justice
In California, Minnesota, and North Carolina, the chief justice of the
state’s highest court decides whether and where to consolidate cases.66 In
Minnesota and North Carolina, the chief justice alone makes the
consolidation and choice-of-transferee decisions.67 The chief justice is
elected in nonpartisan elections in Minnesota and partisan elections in North
Carolina. In California, the gubernatorially appointed chief justice has
57

COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(a)(1).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.69(b)(1) (2020).
59
History, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/supctmanh/
A_Brief_history_of_the_Court.shtml [https://perma.cc/LS2S-PRCV].
60
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 74.161(a) (West 2019).
61
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.4 (2020).
62
W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.02.
63
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-242(c)(1) (2014); N.J. CT. R. 4:38A; OR. R. CIV.
P. 32K.
64
Or. R. Civ. P. 32K(2).
65
Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State Courts.
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49.
66
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404 (West 2021); COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(a)(1); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC.
113.03(a); N.C. GEN. R. PRAC. SUPER. & DIST. CTS. 2.1(a)–(b).
67
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 113.03(a); N.C. GEN. R. PRAC. SUPER. & DIST. CTS. 2.1(a)–(b).
58
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ultimate authority on consolidation and transfer, but California has an
elaborate system by which other judges provide advice on the consolidation
decision and selection of the transferee judge. This system is discussed in
greater detail in Section II.A.
d. Hybrid
Finally, Connecticut has adopted a hybrid system. Connecticut assigns
transfer authority to the chief court administrator along with the trial judges
and the parties.68 The state’s chief justice has the authority to select the judge
who will serve as the chief court administrator.69 Judges and justices in
Connecticut are appointed by the governor.70
2. Peer States
Peer MDL states vest the authority to consolidate cases in the hands of
trial court judges with pending cases. But there is variation in which trial
court judge gets to make that decision and in how those judges are put on the
bench.
a. First-filed judge
In Indiana, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, the judge in the earliest
filed action can order other cases filed around the state to be transferred to
that judge’s court.71 Massachusetts and Pennsylvania also give the judge in
the first-filed case the discretion to transfer all of the cases to a court where
later filed cases are pending,72 though in Massachusetts there is a
presumption that the cases will be consolidated in the court with the firstfiled case.73 Trial judges in Indiana and Pennsylvania are elected in local
partisan elections, and in Massachusetts are appointed by the governor.74
b. Any judge
In New Hampshire, any judge receiving a motion to consolidate can
decide on consolidation and transfer.75 Similarly, in Maine and Rhode Island,
the rules provide that any judge with a pending case can order a joint hearing

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-347b (2019).
Id.
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49.
IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D); MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31; PA. R. CIV. P. 213.1.
See MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31; PA. R. CIV. P. 213.1(c).
See MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31.
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49.
N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 12(b).
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or trial.76 Trial judges are appointed by the governor in Maine, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island.77
c. Joint decision
Finally, in Wisconsin, the transferee and transferor judges must issue a
joint order for consolidation.78 Trial judges in Wisconsin are elected in local
nonpartisan elections.79
3. Summary
Table 2 summarizes the institutional design adopted by states with
institutional and peer MDL systems. It also includes information on the four
ad hoc states described above.
TABLE 2: STATE MDL INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

Model

Decider
Panel
Supreme court

Institutional

Chief justice
Hybrid

Peer

First-filed judge
Any judge
Joint decision
Supreme court

Ad Hoc
District judges en
banc
76

State
Colorado, New York, Texas, Virginia (new
each time), West Virginia
Kansas, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon
Minnesota (chief alone), North Carolina
(chief alone), California (advice from
coordination motion judge)
Connecticut (chief court administrator or
trial judge)
Indiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island
Wisconsin
Michigan (breast implants and Microsoft
antitrust), Oklahoma (breast implants and
others), South Carolina (breast implants)
Tennessee (one county by local rule)

This power goes beyond the usual consolidation rule exemplified by Federal Rule 42 because the
rules in Maine and Rhode Island expressly provide for consolidation across different counties. See ME.
R. CIV. P. 42; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 42(a). Kansas and Massachusetts have this rule as well, but they
also have other consolidation mechanisms described in the text. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-242(a) (2014);
MASS. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
77
Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State Courts.
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us [https://perma.cc/HY75-YLGX].
78
WIS. STAT. § 805.05(1)(b) (2020).
79
Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State Courts.
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us [https://perma.cc/HY75-YLGX].
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C. Consolidation Rules
Institutional design is not the only way that state MDLs can vary. For
example, regardless of which entity or individual has the power to
consolidate, states have to make choices about the standard for consolidation
to be applied and the extent of that consolidation.80
1. Standards for Consolidation
The standard for consolidation is important because it regulates which
cases are candidates for the special venue and assignment rules that define
MDL.81 The standard for consolidation in a federal MDL is broad. The
federal MDL statute requires only that cases share “one or more common
questions of fact” and that the JPML determines that transfer “will be for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions.”82
Some states, like Illinois and Texas, track the federal standard quite
closely, while others diverge in both directions. Some states focus only on
the relatedness of the cases,83 while others apply a stricter transactional test84
or (echoing class action law) ask whether common questions predominate
over individual ones.85 Some states spell out specialized standards, while
others are quite vague. New York and New Jersey include the presence of
consolidated proceedings elsewhere as a factor weighing in favor of
consolidation in those states’ courts. New Jersey and West Virginia limit
consolidation to certain subject matters; Oregon limits consolidation to class
actions; and Virginia specifies a minimum number of plaintiffs. We provide
citations and the relevant language for all of these standards in Table A2. But
one thing they all have in common is that their broad language vests
substantial discretion in the official or institution authorized to decide when
consolidation is appropriate.

80

As above, for readability, we rely primarily on Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A for the citations
to these statutes and rules.
81
Cf. Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1311–14, 1325–41 (discussing the significance of
being in or out of an MDL).
82
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
83
See infra Table A2. Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island require only a
common question of law or fact. Maryland does as well, but we do not consider Maryland to have a true
MDL procedure.
84
See infra Table A2. Kansas and Wisconsin require the cases to arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence. New Hampshire allows consolidation if the cases either arise out of the same transaction
or event or share common issues of law or fact.
85
See infra Table A2. California, Colorado, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia consider, among
other factors, whether common questions predominate.
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2. Extent of Consolidation
A related issue for any MDL system is the extent to which cases are
consolidated. The federal system is notable because it permits consolidations
for pretrial proceedings only.86 Cases must be remanded to the districts
where they were originally filed for trial. In practice, however, this rule is
not as limiting as it appears; less than 3% of cases are ever actually remanded
out of an MDL as of 2013, usually because they are resolved in the MDL
court by settlement or dispositive motion.87 This formally limited nature of
the transfer, though, has been key to making federal MDL work, allowing it
to avoid many of the due process, personal jurisdiction, and choice of law
challenges that largely prevent the use of class actions in mass tort cases.88
Limited transfer does not appear to be an essential feature of state MDL
systems. Only three states—Kansas, New York, and Texas—formally limit
consolidation to pretrial only.89
The rest of the states with institutional and peer MDL systems appear
to allow consolidation for all purposes including trial (though they may
permit or require remand in certain circumstances). The MDL rules or
statutes expressly permit consolidation for trial in California, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.90 Indiana’s statute presumptively limits
consolidations to pretrial only, but it permits transferee judges to oversee
trials if “the court finds that the action involves unusual or complicated issues
of fact or law or involves a substantial question of law of great public
importance.”91

86

Although reformers have often sought to allow federal MDL judges to try transferred cases, in
1998 the U.S. Supreme Court made the temporary nature of the transfer clear in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34–40 (1998).
87
See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 400–01
(2014).
88
See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers
Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1296–99 (2018)
[hereinafter Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms] (describing federal MDL’s “split
personality” and its implications); Bradt & Rave, The Information-Forcing Role, supra note 3, at 1269–
73 (same); Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves,” supra note 3, at 103–04 (same).
89
Technically, Kansas and New York expressly permit consolidation for trial with consent, but we
are discussing here the extent to which the MDL systems consolidate cases.
90
See infra Table A2. Had we included Maryland as a peer state, it would appear on this list as well.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
91
IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(d). See infra Section II.C.2.
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In sum, in most states, MDL consolidation is for all purposes.92 And
even in the three states for which MDL is limited to pretrial proceedings, the
federal experience suggests that most cases will be resolved in the MDL
court. In other words, it is likely the case that MDL judges in all states have
substantial authority to guide most consolidated cases to final resolution.
D. Management
State MDL rules also vary on many issues of MDL management. We
address a selection of these issues here, focusing on those that have been of
interest to MDL scholars and reformers. Indeed, for scholarship on federal
MDL, these issues of MDL management have been of primary concern.93 As
the following descriptions make clear, MDL rules often do not specify
exactly how MDLs should be handled, and even when they do, they vest
substantial discretion in MDL judges.
1. Transferee Court
A central choice in the MDL process is the selection of the transferee
court. The federal statute does not include any limits on the choice of
transferee district. And the JPML has generally felt free to create an MDL in
whatever district it sees fit—even districts where no cases are pending. 94
Some state rules, however, are more restrictive. In at least Kansas,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, the transferee
court must be a court in which at least one of the consolidated actions is

92
We do not have a good theory for why so many states eschew the federal model and allow transfer
for trial purposes. Nor do we have a good theory for why Kansas, New York, and Texas in particular
chose to limit consolidation to pretrial only. One possibility (which we cannot prove) is that both New
York and Texas adopted their institutional MDL procedures after the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear
in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998), that remand was
mandatory in the federal system. (The Kansas MDL rule was adopted before Lexecon, but it appears to
have been rarely used. See HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 283–85.) Many of the states that allow
consolidation for trial purposes adopted their MDL procedures before this decision, when the federal
JPML took the position that MDL transferee judges were permitted to transfer consolidated cases to
themselves for trial. Massachusetts (2015), Minnesota (2000), and New Jersey (2003) are exceptions. See
infra Table A1. Another potential explanation stems from the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
According to recent decisions, consolidation for trial purposes on plaintiffs’ request may result in these
cases becoming removable as “mass actions” under CAFA. See, e.g., Atwell v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 740 F.3d
1160, 1161–62 (8th Cir. 2013). But the availability of CAFA removal does not appear to be a driver in
state MDL design, as most of the MDL systems were adopted before 2005, when CAFA was enacted.
93
See Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1305–11 (collecting sources discussing potential
changes to MDL case management).
94
See, e.g., In re Wright Med. Tech., Inc., Conserve Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 844 F. Supp.
2d 1371, 1373–74 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (consolidating cases in the Northern District of Georgia even though
none of the actions pending at the time of the consolidation were pending in that district).
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pending.95 Massachusetts starts with a presumption that cases should be
consolidated in the court where the earliest filed action is pending.96 Indiana
appears to allow consolidation only in the first-filed court.97 And Colorado
places special limits on consolidation for jury cases.98 California and New
Jersey do not limit the transferee court, but their rules specify factors that
could affect the choice of transferee court.99
2. Tag-Along Cases
Often, after a consolidated proceeding is established, additional cases
are filed or identified that seemingly fit in the consolidated proceeding. In
the federal system, the clerk of the JPML can conditionally transfer so-called
“tag-along” actions; if a party objects, the JPML itself has the option to
vacate the order.100
The states take many different approaches to these sorts of tag-along
cases.101 The transferee judge, upon a motion, can consolidate tag-alongs in
California, Oregon, Virginia, and (with advice and consent of the panel)
West Virginia. In Colorado, the court clerk can effect the transfer. In New
York, unopposed tag-along motions are granted automatically, while
opposed motions go to the panel. In New Jersey, the supreme court’s initial
order can specify when tag-alongs may be transferred automatically. And in
Texas, tag-alongs are transferred upon a notice of filing, but then any party
can ask the transferee court to remand the action. That decision is appealable
to the panel.

95

See infra Table A1.
MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31.
97
IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(d).
98
COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(b)(1) (only allowing jury trials in consolidated cases in venues proper under
Colorado Rule 98).
99
In California, the chief justice selects the transferee court upon a recommendation of the
coordination motion judge. That judge is asked to consider:
96

(1) The number of included actions in particular locations; (2) Whether the litigation is at an
advanced stage in a particular court; (3) The efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources;
(4) The locations of witnesses and evidence; (5) The convenience of the parties and witnesses;
(6) The parties’ principal places of business; (7) The office locations of counsel for the parties;
and (8) The ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations.
CAL. R. CT. 3.530. In New Jersey, the supreme court is to consider “[i]ssues of fairness, geographical
location of parties and attorneys, and the existing civil and multicounty litigation caseload in the
vicinage.” N.J. CTS., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., MULTICOUNTY LITIGATION GUIDELINES DIRECTIVE
# 08-12 (2012).
100
R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 7.1.
101
For all relevant provisions, see infra Table A1.
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3. Lead or Liaison Counsel
In federal MDL, the appointment of lead or liaison counsel is a
contentious issue.102 The federal statute does not expressly authorize the
transferee judge to appoint lawyers, but the practice is well established and
recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigation.
At least five states (California, New York, Texas, Virginia, and West
Virginia) specify the authority to select lead or liaison counsel in their
consolidation rules, though these states’ rules say little about the criteria for
selection.103 New Jersey also advises but does not require the appointment of
liaison counsel.104 Other states are largely silent, though none denies the
MDL judge the authority to appoint lawyers.
4. Remand
Another issue arising in federal MDL that has received considerable
attention is remand.105 In the federal system, the JPML is empowered to
remand cases to transferor courts, though the panel’s near-universal practice
is not to remand unless and until the transferee judge suggests it.106
There is variation in the states regarding which institution decides when
remand is appropriate. In at least California, Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia, the transferee judge has the power
to remand without any action on the part of the panel, high court, or other
institution.107 In Illinois, the supreme court can separate and remand any
claim at any time.108 In West Virginia, the panel has special authority to

102
See generally, e.g., Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves,” supra note 3 (arguing that
repeat-player attorneys appointed to MDL leadership positions add value for plaintiffs); Burch,
Monopolies, supra note 3 (arguing that MDL leadership-appointment practices favor repeat-player
attorneys who may feel more loyalty to each other than to their clients); Burch & Williams, supra note 3
(demonstrating extent to which repeat players are appointed to MDL leadership positions); Silver &
Miller, supra note 3 (arguing that MDL lead lawyers may feel more loyal to judges than clients because
judges have so much control over attorney compensation).
103
See infra Table A1 for relevant statutes.
104
See N.J. CTS., NEW JERSEY MULTICOUNTY LITIGATION (NON-ASBESTOS) RESOURCE BOOK 12
(4th
ed.
2014),
https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/mcl/nonasbestosmanual.pdf?c=7ir
[https://perma.cc/PJ4U-MMSL]. Though not addressing lead or liaison counsel per se, we also note that
Massachusetts’s rules require the transferee judge to hold an early conference among the parties “to
establish a Tracking Order for the consolidated cases and to address other matters raised by the
consolidation.” MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31. This presumably may include counsel appointments.
105
See generally, e.g., Symposium, The Rest of the Story: Resolving the Cases Remanded by the
MDL, 75 LA. L. REV. 341 (2014) (featuring articles and comments that focus on remand in MDL).
106
See Burch, supra note 87, at 402.
107
See infra Table A1. In Kansas, the transferee judge must notify the supreme court when it remands
cases, but no action appears to be required of the supreme court. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-242(c)(3) (2014).
108
Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 384(b).
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remand cases if they are certified as class actions.109 And, interestingly, under
Michigan’s ad hoc order for the breast-implant litigation, cases were
automatically remanded following the close of discovery and required
settlement conferences.110
5. Appellate Review
The federal MDL statute provides that any review of the JPML’s
decisions to consolidate shall be conducted on a petition for a writ of
mandamus.111 Decisions not to consolidate are not reviewable.112
A handful of states’ rules provide for special procedures for review.113
Texas provides that the supreme court has jurisdiction to review orders to
consolidate or to decline consolidation—but only by extraordinary writ (i.e.,
mandamus) in an original proceeding. The California rule provides that any
court with jurisdiction under the usual statutes may review a coordination
decision. Pennsylvania and Virginia expressly provide for review of
decisions to consolidate, but not decisions to decline consolidation. New
York prohibits review of the consolidation decision altogether.
Although a recent proposal has sought to expand interlocutory review,
the federal MDL statute does not currently provide any special mechanism
for reviewing the transferee judge’s decisions.114 State MDL systems do not
appear to be any more enamored of expanded interlocutory review of an
MDL judge’s decisions. Most state MDL procedures say nothing about
appeals. Virginia’s MDL statute expressly authorizes interlocutory review in
consolidated cases, but only in situations where it would be appropriate in
any case.115 Interlocutory review in Virginia is permitted in any case when
the trial judge certifies that the decision “involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate

109

See W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.10.
See In re Silicone Gel Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., Admin. Order No. 1993-2 (Mich. 1993). Federal
MDL judges are sometimes criticized for holding onto trial-ready cases in an attempt to orchestrate a
global settlement, and some scholars have suggested a similar approach of automatically remanding
nonsettling cases in federal MDLs. See, e.g., Burch, Monopolies, supra note 3, at 152–54.
111
28 U.S.C. § 1407(e).
112
Id.
113
For all relevant provisions, see infra Table A1.
114
See Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105 (2017). For
trenchant criticism of this proposal, see Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict
Litigation in Historical Perspective, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (2018).
115
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.8(A) (2020).
110
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termination of the litigation.”116 The California and Texas MDL rules specify
which appellate court will have jurisdiction over decisions of the transferor
and transferee courts, but do not alter the ordinary rules for interlocutory
appeals.117 Notably, however, Texas’s MDL rules provide that the transferee
court can overrule the transferor court’s orders, while the transferee court’s
orders are generally binding after the case is remanded for trial.118
E. Source of Law
Finally, we want to pause for a moment on the sources of relevant laws
governing state MDLs. The federal MDL system is a creature of statute,
though the JPML has been given the authority to develop its own rules of
procedure, “not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”119
In the states, MDL was created by statute in California, Connecticut,
Kansas, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.120 Of these states, California,
Connecticut, and Kansas are “code states,” meaning that they typically rely
on the legislature to adopt major rules of procedure.121
MDL was created by court rule in Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.122
(Tennessee’s local rule is also judge-made, as were the ad hoc orders in
Michigan, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.) Note that Illinois, New York, and
North Carolina typically rely on their legislatures to make rules of civil
116
Id. § 8.01-267.8(B); cf. id. § 8.01-670.1 (providing for interlocutory review in the normal course
for “a question of law as to which (i) there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, (ii) there is no
clear, controlling precedent on point in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia or the Court of
Appeals of Virginia, (iii) determination of the issues will be dispositive of a material aspect of the
proceeding currently pending before the court, and (iv) it is in the parties’ best interest to seek an
interlocutory appeal”). Virginia MDL provisions (i) and (iii) track the language in the federal
interlocutory appeal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
117
In Texas, the appellate court with jurisdiction over the court where the case is pending at the time
of appeal can review orders of both the transferor and transferee courts. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.9(b).
In California, the coordination order must specify which appellate court will have jurisdiction over
appeals if the coordinated actions fall within the jurisdiction of more than one reviewing court. CAL. R.
CT. 3.505(a).
118
TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.8.
119
28 U.S.C. § 1407(f). See generally Bradt, supra note 2, at 871–72, 880–81 (explaining why
proponents of federal MDL pursued statutory reform rather than seeking to amend the Federal Rules).
120
See infra Table A1.
121
See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–11
(2018) [hereinafter Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure] (discussing “code states” and “rules states”).
122
See infra Table A1. Had we included Maryland, it would be listed among those states relying on
court rule. See supra note 22.
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procedure,123 but their consolidation rules were included in other judge-made
rule sources.124
F. A Brief Comment on Variation
This Part has summarized our survey of state MDLs. In so doing, it has
revealed wide variation in the details of state MDL systems around the core
notion of intercourt coordination—with substantial discretion vested in
MDL judges and in those officials or institutions that select the MDL judge.
We have more to say about the state-to-state variation below, but at this
point, two preliminary comments are in order. First, we want to express
caution about reaching firm normative conclusions about the variations we
described. As discussed in more detail below, there is reasonable
disagreement about the goals and priorities of state MDL systems, so even if
we had measurable results of state choices, it would be impossible to offer a
single answer about which system is “best.”
That said, a second observation is that the variation in decisional
authority, consolidation standards, and other features suggests that there may
be fewer “essential” aspects of an MDL system than some might think. We
should not, therefore, feel compelled to support every aspect of the current
federal MDL structure just because a group of federal judges fifty years ago
thought it would work. Instead, a better approach is to think clearly about
MDL design and its consequences—a task that we take up below.
II. CASE STUDIES
To expand on our survey, in this Part we take a deep dive into the origins
and operation of three states’ MDL systems: California, Texas, and Indiana.
We chose California and Texas because they are two of the largest legal
markets in the nation and both have well-developed institutional MDL
systems. We chose Indiana because it is an excellent example of a peer MDL
system in a state with elected judges.
In these case studies, we examine the history of these states’ adoption
of an MDL system and the law governing coordinated proceedings. We also
report some data on how these procedures are used and in which types of
cases. Additional data are included in the Appendices. We conclude this Part
123

See Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, supra note 121, at 10.
In Illinois, the MDL procedure was adopted as a supreme court rule. See infra Table A1. Illinois’s
supreme court rules are typically adopted by the court. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3. The Illinois legislature
handles trial court procedure only. See Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, supra note 121, at 10. For
New York, the MDL rule is included in the uniform trial court rules, which are judge-made. See infra
Table A1. For North Carolina, the MDL rule is included in the judge-made General Rules of Practice.
Infra Table A1.
124

1676

115:1649 (2021)

MDL in the States

with some data about the use of MDL procedures in other states with MDL
systems.
A. California
1. History
In 1968, Congress adopted the federal Multi-District Litigation Act.125
Just four years later, in the midst of a perceived litigation crisis and the rise
of judicial case management, California adopted its MDL statute. The state
legislature added a new chapter to the Code of Civil Procedure called
“Coordination,” to be effective on January 1, 1974.126 Elaborating on the new
code sections were a set of rules of court adopted by the judiciary, also
effective on January 1, 1974.127 Taken together, these code provisions and
court rules govern California’s version of MDL, referred to as “Judicial
Council Coordination Proceedings” or a “Civil Case Coordination
Proceeding.”128
The legislative history of the procedure is fairly plain. Charles Hugh
Warren introduced the proposed coordination procedure in the state
assembly on March 13, 1972.129 After amendments in the judiciary
committee,130 the bill passed the assembly on the consent calendar by a vote
of seventy-six to zero.131 The bill was minimally amended in the state
senate,132 and the assembly quickly and unanimously concurred in the
amendments.133 The Governor signed the bill on December 7, 1972.134
As its origins suggest, the California procedure emphasized efficiency
and case management. Consistent with broader trends toward managerial

125
28 U.S.C. § 1407; see generally Bradt, supra note 2 (examining the origins of the federal-MDL
statute).
126
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 404 et seq. (2021); 1972 CAL. STAT. 2286, 2287.
127
See CAL. R. OF CT. 3.501 et seq. (formerly Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1501 et seq.).
128
See, e.g., Civil Case Coordination, JUD. BRANCH OF CAL., https://www.courts.ca.gov/27922.htm
[https://perma.cc/6MBU-QQRP]; JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., CIVIL CASE COORDINATION PROCEEDING
(JCCP) LOG, https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/CivilCaseCoord_2015toPresent_JCCPLog.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JW9P-LU55].
129
CAL. ASSEMB. J. 802 (Mar. 18, 1972).
130
CAL. ASSEMB. J. 5022 (June 19, 1972). The bill was re-referred to the Ways and Means
Committee, and that committee recommended passage without amendment. Id. at 5249 (June 22, 1972);
id. at 5542 (June 29, 1972).
131
CAL. ASSEMB. J. 5846 (July 5, 1972).
132
Compare A.B. 930, 1972 Leg. (Cal. 1972), with CAL. ASSEMB. J. 7711 (Nov. 17, 1972); id. at
7743–44 (Nov. 20, 1972) (reflecting only minimal changes).
133
CAL. ASSEMB. J. 7744 (Nov. 20, 1972).
134
1972 CAL. STAT. 2286, 2286.
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judging,135 the code provisions expressly linked coordination to the prospects
of settlement,136 and the rules suggested that the judge overseeing the
coordination should “assume an active role in managing all steps of the
pretrial, discovery, and trial proceedings to expedite the just determination
of the coordinated actions without delay.”137 According to one early decision,
the purpose of the coordination procedure was “to promote judicial
efficiency and economy.”138
A major innovation in the coordination procedure came with the 1996
amendments, introduced by State Senator Cathie Wright and passed
unanimously by the assembly and senate.139 The 1996 amendments linked
the coordination procedure to a designation in California law for “complex
cases.”140 The new provisions specified that formal coordination would be
available only for complex cases, to be defined by the state’s judicial
council.141
The history of the “complex” designation is revealing. Although the
judicial council had considered complex cases at least since the early
1980s,142 important developments coincided with the 1996 reforms. In that
year, the California judiciary was considering a proposal to establish a
special court for business and commercial cases.143 Business courts were
becoming more popular around the country,144 but after studying the issue,

135
See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (describing and
analyzing those trends).
136
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 404.1 (2021).
137
CAL. R. CT. 1541(b) (West 1974).
138
Citicorp v. Super. Ct., 261 Cal. Rptr. 668, 669 n.3 (Ct. App. 1989).
139
1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3875 (West). Records of the votes are on file with authors.
140
The 1996 amendments also addressed noncomplex cases in response to a flood of requests to the
judicial council to coordinate noncomplex cases for which no special expertise was required. See S.
JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1726 (1996). The amendments called for trial judges to
handle noncomplex coordination on their own. Id.; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 403 (West 2020). For
noncomplex cases, therefore, California is a “peer MDL” state.
141
1996 Cal. Stat. 3875. The Senate Bill Analysis noted: “It is unknown whether the Judicial Council
has adopted its rules and definition of a ‘complex’ case for purposes of implementing the bill.” S.
JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1726 (1996).
142
The category was originally dealt with in Section 19 of the Standards of Judicial Administration
(effective 1982), which is now CAL. R. CT. Standard 3.10.
143
See PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, NICOLE L. MOTT & TIMOTHY F. FAUTSKO, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE CTS., CAL. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., EVALUATION OF THE CENTERS FOR COMPLEX CIVIL
LITIGATION PILOT PROGRAM (2003) (describing the genesis of the specialty business and commercial
courts in a 1997 task force report); Minutes, Judicial Council Meeting, May 16, 1997, Item 16 (on file
with journal).
144
For a discussion of “business courts” and interstate competition, see infra Section III.A.
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the task force decided not to recommend them for California.145 Instead, it
suggested creating a new task force on complex case management.146 The
task force was charged with defining “complex cases”147 and preparing
guidance for their active management.148 Later, the judicial council created a
complex litigation program with special courts in certain jurisdictions.149 The
linking of the state’s coordination procedure to this new “complex case”
designation and later to the complex case program developed by the judicial
council further emphasized active case management and settlement in
coordinated proceedings.150
2. Coordinated Proceeding Procedure
A California civil case coordination proceeding151 begins with a petition
for coordination submitted to the chair of the judicial council, who is the
chief justice of California.152 Coordination is only available when complex
cases are pending in different courts.153 Judges have the ultimate authority to
determine whether a case is complex.154

145

See HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 143, at 1; Minutes, Judicial Council Meeting, May 16,
1997, Item 16 (on file with journal).
146
HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 143, at 1.
147
See CAL. R. CT. 3.400 et seq.
148
This guidance later became the California Deskbook on Complex Civil Litigation Management
(LexisNexis, Matthew Bender 2005). HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 143, at 2.
149
More specifically, in 2000, the judicial council established a pilot program for complex cases in
six counties. Today, there are at least eight courts with complex litigation programs. See Nathanial Wood,
Greg Call & Van Nguyen, California’s Complex Court Program, CROWELL & MORING LLP (Jan. 2016),
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/Publications/Articles/Californias-Complex-Court-Program,
[https://perma.cc/5D3S-QMGR]. In these complex programs, case management is emphasized and a
single judge is assigned to handle the entire proceeding. See CAL. R. CT. Standard 3.10(b); id. r. 3.734;
id. r. 10.950. Only select judges are authorized to hear complex cases. Id. r. 3.10(c).
150
See supra notes 140, 149 and accompanying text (discussing complex cases). For another history
of the California procedure, see Scott Paetty, Classless Not Clueless: A Comparison of Case Management
Mechanisms for Non-Class-Based Complex Litigation in California and Federal Courts, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 845, 847–51 (2008).
151
Note that we focus here on the formal coordination procedure for complex cases; the California
code also uses the term coordination for a trial-judge procedure for noncomplex cases, but we do not
address it here. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 403 (West 2020).
152
Id. § 404; CAL. R. CT. 10.1(a)(1). Petitions may be submitted by the presiding judge in any court
in which a case is pending, by all plaintiffs or all defendants jointly, or by any party with the permission
of the presiding judge. Id. r. 3.544. Petitions also specify the preferred site for coordination. See id. r.
3.521.
153
CIV. PROC. § 404. Prior to the merging of trial courts (i.e., municipal, justice, and superior), the
coordination procedure also was available for cases in different courts in the same county. See 1980 CAL.
STAT. 654; 1982 CAL. STAT. 798.
154
CIV. PROC. § 404; CAL. R. CT. 3.502. The definition of complex cases is provided at CAL. R. CT.
3.400(a).
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Upon receipt of a petition, the chief justice designates a “coordination
motion judge” or authorizes a presiding judge of a court to assign the matter
to a judge in that court in the usual manner,155 which can vary, but it is not
necessarily random assignment.156 The coordination motion judge advises
the chief justice on the coordination decision. According to the statute,
coordination is appropriate when there is a common question of fact or law
and coordination would serve the ends of justice.157
If the coordination motion judge decides that coordination is
appropriate, the coordination motion judge must suggest a court for the
coordinated proceeding.158 The chief justice is ultimately responsible for
selecting a trial court and either selecting a “coordination trial judge” or
authorizing the presiding judge of the selected trial court to assign the matter
to a judge in that court in the usual manner.159
155

CAL. R. CT. 3.501(7); CIV. PROC. § 404.
CAL. R. CT. 3.10(c) (“In selecting judges for complex litigation assignments, the presiding judge
should consider the needs of the court and the judge’s ability, interest, training, experience (including
experience with complex civil cases), and willingness to participate in educational programs related to
the management of complex cases.”); id. r. 3.734 (“The presiding judge may, on the noticed motion of a
party or on the court’s own motion, order the assignment of any case to one judge for all or such limited
purposes as will promote the efficient administration of justice.”); id. r. 10.950 (“The presiding judge . . .
retains final authority over all criminal and civil case assignments.”); id. r. 10.603(c)(1) (“The presiding
judge has ultimate authority to make judicial assignments.”); E-mail from Judge Carolyn Kuhl to authors
(July 4, 2019, 12:15 CST) (on file with journal). Note, also, that parties can seek to overturn the
assignment with a peremptory challenge. See CAL. R. CT. 3.516; see also Philip Morris Inc. v. Superior
Ct., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 672 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs’ peremptory challenge motion was
properly granted).
157
CIV. PROC. § 404.1; see also Keenan v. Superior Ct., 168 Cal. Rptr. 561, 562 (Ct. App. 1980)
(interpreting CIV. PROC. § 404.1 in a conflict between an order for coordination of five cases and an order
from another judge regarding three of those same cases). In so deciding, the coordination motion judge
is asked to consider
156

whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the
convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the
work product of counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar
of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and,
the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.
CIV. PROC. § 404.1.
158
CAL. R. CT. 3.530. The Rule specifies that the motion judge should consider:
“(1) The number of included actions in particular locations; (2) Whether the litigation is at an
advanced stage in a particular court; (3) The efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources;
(4) The locations of witnesses and evidence; (5) The convenience of the parties and witnesses;
(6) The parties’ principal places of business; (7) The office locations of counsel for the parties;
and (8) The ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations.”
Id.
159
CIV. PROC. § 404.3; CAL. R. CT. 3.540(a). For a discussion of the “usual manner,” see supra notes
155–156 and accompanying text.
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Unlike federal MDL, which is for pretrial proceedings only, California
cases are coordinated for both pretrial proceedings and trial.160 The
coordination trial judge is granted the powers of any judge hearing a civil
case.161 But the rules also specifically call upon the coordination trial judge
to “assume an active role in managing all steps of the pretrial, discovery, and
trial proceedings to expedite the just determination of the coordinated actions
without delay.”162 And the rules provide a sort of checklist of casemanagement techniques that the coordination trial judge may wish to use,
including appointing liaison counsel.163 According to one decision, the
coordination trial judge is provided “whatever great breadth of discretion
may be necessary and appropriate to ease the transition through the judicial
system of the logjam of cases which gives rise to coordination.”164
The California rules do not mention cooperation with other courts, but
trial judges have facilitated cooperation with federal MDLs and cases in
other states. For example, in the vitamin antitrust cases, a coordination trial
judge in San Francisco oversaw a settlement of state indirect-purchaser
antitrust cases in parallel with a settlement of direct-purchaser suits in a
federal MDL.165 Similarly, in the Vioxx litigation, the federal MDL judge
coordinated with the California state MDL judge throughout the

160

See supra Section I.C.
CAL. R. CT. 3.540.
162
Id. r. 3.541(b). Judge Kuhl agreed that, especially in coordinated cases, California judges were
active case managers. See Telephone Interview with Judge Carolyn Kuhl (May 8, 2019) [hereinafter Kuhl
Interview] (interview notes on file with journal).
163
See CAL. R. CT. 3.541, 3.506.
164
McGhan Med. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 269–70 (Ct. App. 1992). For an
example of case management in a coordinated proceeding, consider the Lockheed Litigation Cases, No.
B262820, 2017 WL 3187676 (Cal. Ct. App. July 27, 2017). More than 600 current and former employees
of Lockheed sued the company in California state court for personal injuries from chemical exposure. Id.
at *1. The cases were coordinated, and the coordination trial judge created a group of “pilot” claims to be
resolved first. Id. The case management order provided that the results of those cases would bind the
other cases via collateral estoppel. Id. Bellwether trials were held, but, for various reasons, most cases
remained unresolved after eight years in the trial court—a state of affairs the judge referred to as
“scandalous.” Id. at *2. In response, the judge took even more aggressive steps, attempting to resolve
many outstanding evidentiary issues (including general causation) and to apply those decisions to all
unresolved cases. After decades in court, and relying heavily on these all-case determinations, the
coordination trial court was able to resolve all coordinated claims. Id. at *2–3.
165
See In re Vitamin Cases, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 358 (Ct. App. 2003); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.,
209 F.R.D. 251 (D.D.C. 2002). Indirect purchasers may not recover under federal antitrust law, but they
may recover under California law. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 2020).
161
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proceeding.166 And it is only a matter time before the newly selected
California opioid judge is coordinating with the federal MDL judge in Ohio.
3. The Data
The Judicial Council of California collects data on civil case
coordination proceedings, and the office generously provided a selection of
those data for purposes of this study.167 We analyze below petitions disposed
of from January 1, 2014 through May 22, 2019, a period of roughly five-anda-half years.
a. Petitions and dispositions
During our period of study, California received at least 223 petitions for
civil case coordination. The state granted 163 of those petitions,168 denied or
dismissed at least 47 petitions, and at least 13 petitions were withdrawn
before disposition.169 These numbers suggest a grant rate of about 78%, on
par with the grant rate in federal MDL for most of its history, but higher than
the federal rate in recent years.170
b. Case type
We attempted to categorize the subject matter of the 163 granted
petitions, relying on case names and secondary sources.171 By far the largest
category was wage-and-hour (employment) petitions, which numbered at
least 79 (48%). There were at least 29 (18%) products liability petitions, and
at least 14 (9%) mass-accident or tort petitions, totaling at least 26% of
petitions sounding in tort. We also found at least 13 (8%) consumer law
petitions and 9 (6%) investor or corporate law petitions. The remaining 19
petitions dealt with privacy, probate, environmental, and contract law,
among other subjects. This information is displayed in Figure 2.
These results depart from the early history of California procedure: a
study of the first 100 petitions for civil case coordination found that almost
40% were personal-injury petitions, with little if any employment

166

In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CIV. 05-4578, 2010 WL 724084, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 18,
2010). For more on Vioxx, see infra note 366 and accompanying text.
167
Full dataset is on file with the authors.
168
Although we do not have data on this point, one experienced judge estimated that parties agreed
to coordination in 80% of cases in which coordination petitions were granted. See Kuhl Interview, supra
note 162.
169
There were more ambiguities in the not-granted category, which is why we use the “at least”
construction.
170
See Clopton & Bradt, Party Preferences, supra note 3, at 1724 & n.56; Williams & George, supra
note 3, at 433 fig.1.
171
For more detail, see infra Appendix B.
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litigation.172 Further, while the federal JPML almost never consolidates
public law cases, California has coordinated public law cases on multiple
occasions, including cases challenging California’s treatment of same-sex
marriage.173
FIGURE 2: CALIFORNIA COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS BY TYPE
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To help compare the subject matter of California cases to federal MDL,
Figure 3 below reflects the compiled category data for federal MDLs
pending in February 2021.174 While California’s coordinated proceedings are
dominated by wage-and-hour cases, employment comprises only a small
fraction of federal MDLs. Products liability cases, which are thought of as
the engine of federal MDL, represent a substantially smaller share of
California coordinated proceedings.175

172

Alexander B. Yakutis, Multicourt Litigation Coordination: The First 100 Petitions, 10 J.
BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASSOC. 12, 12–15 (1976).
173
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). For a discussion of the absence of public law
cases in federal MDL, see Bradt & Clopton, MDL v. Trump, supra note 4, at 924–27.
174
U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT - DOCKET TYPE
SUMMARY (2021), https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_MDL_
Type-February-17-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AED-X4BV].
175
Note that these results treat each coordinated case or MDL as a unit, but of course not all
coordinated cases or MDLs are created equal. Some MDLs contain many more consolidated actions and
parties than others. For more on this point on the federal side, see Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note
2, at 1316–20.
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FIGURE 3: FEDERAL MDLS BY TYPE
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c. Courts and judges
We then turned our attention to the courts and judges selected to
participate in California MDL. These choices have been a point of interest
in the study of federal MDL, so we provide substantial additional detail in
Appendix B.
Briefly, California coordinated proceedings were frequently, though
not always, created in large population centers. Los Angeles County led the
way with 63 (39%). The chief justice appeared to make appointments
directly in about one-quarter of cases, relying on the motion judge or the
local district in three-quarters. There were some “repeat players” among
coordination motion and trial judges but also some new blood among
appointees. For example, 55 different judges served as trial judges, with no
judge handling more than 11 coordinated proceedings.
Of the trial judge assignments, 55 (36%) were to female judges and 99
(64%) were to male judges.176 These results are roughly on par with a recent
study of federal judges selected to handle MDLs.177 They are almost perfectly

176
Among the cases assigned directly by the chief justice, though, female coordination trial judges
were assigned in 58% of cases (14 of 24). Infra Appendix B.
177
See Clopton & Bradt, Party Preferences, supra note 3, at 1739 tbl.5 (finding that, from 2012 to
2016, about 30% of MDL judges were female and almost 40% of first-time MDL judges were female).
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on par with the overall pool of California trial judges, which, according to a
2018 report, was 36.1% female.178
One dimension worthy of comment is partisan affiliation. Unlike in
Texas and Indiana (addressed below), where trial judges are elected in
partisan elections, California trial judges are elected in nonpartisan
elections.179 However, it turns out that many judges first joined the bench as
gubernatorial appointees filling vacancies. Looking only at judges
previously appointed by governors, we found that slightly more than twothirds of coordinated proceedings were assigned to judges appointed by
Republican governors.180
d. Parallel federal MDLs
Finally, we tried to determine whether the California coordinated
proceedings had corresponding federal MDLs. We did so by hand-checking
California cases against the JPML’s lists of federal MDLs, as well as
searching the federal Panel’s orders on Westlaw. We were able to identify
17 California proceedings with parallel federal MDLs,181 meaning that at
least 10% of California proceedings had federal analogs.182 Notably, all 17
were products liability cases, representing more than half of California’s
products liability proceedings in this period. We also found 5 California
cases in which the federal Panel had denied motions for consolidation.183

178
JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., DEMOGRAPHIC DATA PROVIDED BY JUSTICES AND JUDGES RELATIVE TO
GENDER, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND GENDER IDENTITY/SEXUAL ORIENTATION (GOV. CODE § 12011.5(N)) 1
(2018), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2019-JO-Demographic-Data.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7Y62TT8] [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHIC DATA]. Race and ethnicity are more difficult to assess without access
to judicial records. Using publicly available sources that identify the judges’ race or ethnicity we were
able to find only eight appointments to nonwhite judges. While our methodology is necessarily imprecise,
this is lower than the percentage of nonwhite judges assigned federal MDLs in the prior study, see Clopton
& Bradt, Party Preferences, supra note 3 at 1737 tbl.3, and much lower than the percentage of nonwhite
California trial judges (34%), see DEMOGRAPHIC DATA, supra, at 1.
179
Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State
Courts. See Judicial Selection in the States, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us
[https://perma.cc/X4GV-P4UU].
180
We found 102 cases assigned to trial judges appointed by Republican governors and 50 cases
assigned to trial judges appointed by Democratic governors. For cases assigned by the chief justice
directly, we found 40% assigned to judges appointed by Democratic governors and 60% assigned to
judges appointed by Republican governors. The chief justice during the entire period was an appointee
of a Democratic governor.
181
Of the 17 federal MDLs with California analogs, 4 were consolidated in California district courts.
Results on file with authors.
182
Results on file with authors. We say “at least” because it is possible that other California
proceedings have federal equivalents that were not discovered by our method.
183
Results on file with authors.
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Four of those 5 were products liability cases; the fifth was a wage-and-hour
case.
B. Texas
1. History
Texas’s MDL procedure is much newer than California’s. It was
adopted in 2003 as part of a major tort reform bill, though its origins go back
at least several years earlier.184
In 1997, the Texas supreme court adopted Rule 11 of the Texas Rules
of Judicial Administration,185 which allowed the presiding judge of each of
the state’s nine administrative judicial regions to assign cases from across
the region to a single judge for pretrial proceedings.186 But because the rule
relied on the administrative judicial regions, statewide disputes could not be
coordinated in a single court; at best, they could be consolidated in front of
nine judges from the nine different administrative regions.187
In light of these limits, in 2001, the Texas supreme court enlisted
Houston trial lawyer Joe Jamail to chair a committee to look into mass
litigation, among other issues.188 One of the committee’s recommendations
was an MDL procedure that allowed for statewide consolidation for pretrial
proceedings and trial,189 though only in courts where venue would have been
proper for all of the cases.190

184
For an excellent summary of the drafting history and early functioning of the Texas MDL
procedure, see Stephen G. Tipps, MDL Comes to Texas, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 829 (2005). And for our more
detailed analysis of Texas MDL, see Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 369.
185
Lonny S. Hoffman, The Trilogy of 2003: Venue, Forum Non Conveniens & Multidistrict
Litigation, 24 ADVOCATE 74, 74 (2003).
186
TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 11. At the time Texas had nine administrative judicial regions. Today it has
eleven. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.042 (West 2019).
187
Technically the rule allowed for further consolidation, but Chief Justice Tom Phillips was
reluctant to use this mechanism. See Hoffman, supra note 185, at 80; see also Hearing of the Supreme
Court Advisory Committee 8875–76 (Tex. 2003) (statement of Chief Justice Phillips),
https://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourtAdvisoryCommittee/Meetings/2003
/transcripts/sc06212003.pdf [https://perma.cc/H65S-WMVW].
188
Order Creating the Sup. Ct. Task Force on Civ. Litig. Improvements, Misc. Doc. No. 01-9149
(Tex. 2001), https://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/AdministrativeOrders/
miscdocket/01/01-9149.pdf [https://perma.cc/27JJ-P6YP].
189
Letter from Joseph Jamail to Justice Nathan Hecht (Mar. 25, 2003) (draft of Rule 42b.1)
[hereinafter Jamail Committee Report] (on file with journal); see also Memorandum from Paul Schlaud
to Supreme Court Task Force (Mar. 15, 2002) (comparing proposed changes to Rule 11 and Rule 42,
noting that both apply to pretrial and trial MDL coordination) (on file with journal); Memorandum from
Paul Schlaud to Supreme Court Task Force (Mar. 4, 2002) (on file with journal).
190
Jamail Committee Report, supra note 189.
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Before the Texas supreme court could act on the committee’s
recommendations, a new Republican majority in the Texas House of
Representatives introduced House Bill 4 (HB4), a piece of tort reform
legislation that included MDL provisions. HB4’s MDL provisions had the
support of defense-side interest groups and were opposed by prominent
plaintiffs’ lawyers.191 The bill, as amended, provided for an MDL panel,
appointed by the chief justice, with the power to transfer cases anywhere in
the state for pretrial proceedings only.192 HB4 passed the Texas house and
senate, and Governor Rick Perry signed it into law on June 11, 2003.193
HB4 left most of the details of MDL proceedings to the Texas supreme
court, so the court’s advisory committee worked quickly to develop MDL
rules. The advisory committee relied on the statute, the Jamail report, and
MDL models from the federal courts, California, and Colorado.194 One
driving concern was that no money had been appropriated to the MDL
panel,195 so the proposed rules sought to shift burdens from the panel to
parties and trial courts.196 On August 29, 2003, the Texas supreme court
adopted MDL procedures in a new Rule 13, and thus began Texas’s MDL
system.197
2. MDL Procedure
A Texas MDL begins when a party or a judge makes a request with the
MDL panel, appointed by the chief justice. The panel’s standard for creating
an MDL is broad. Mirroring the federal standard, the cases must share “one
or more common questions of fact” and the transfer must be “for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses” and must “promote the just and
efficient conduct” of the related cases.198 Common questions need not
191
See HOUSE RSCH. ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, HB4, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND TORT LIABILITY
REVISIONS 51–52 (2003), https://hro.house.texas.gov/pdf/ba78R/HB0004.PDF [https://perma.cc/63GZ2FEW].
192
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West 2019).
193
H.R. 4, 2003 Leg., 78th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003), https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/78R/billtext/
pdf/HB00004F.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/6SHC-W2GG].
194
Hearing of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, supra note 187, at 8876–77, 8902–03.
195
See, e.g., id. at 9000–01.
196
Id. at 9320–21.
197
Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
Texas Rules of Evidence, and the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration, Misc. Docket No. 03-9145
(Tex. 2003).
198
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West 2019); TEX R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(l). The Texas MDL
panel asks two questions: (1) are the cases sufficiently “related” and (2) would transfer and consolidation
in front of a pretrial judge serve the goals of convenience and efficiency? See, e.g., In re Tex. Opioid
Litig., MDL No. 18-0358, slip op. at 4–10 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2018). The panel has explained that, “[w]hile
the number of common fact questions necessary to cause cases to be related is not capable of a bright-

1687

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

predominate.199 The MDL panel is also responsible for assigning coordinated
cases: MDLs may be assigned to any active district judge in the state or any
former or retired district or appellate court judge who has been approved by
the chief justice.200
Like the federal MDL system, transfer into a Texas MDL is for pretrial
purposes only.201 For this reason, in Texas, the MDL transferee court is
referred to as the “pretrial court,” and the transferor court is referred to as the
“trial court.”202 The pretrial court is authorized to set aside or modify rulings
made by the trial court before the transfer occurred.203 And the pretrial judge
is encouraged to engage in active case management.204 Pretrial judges may
not try transferred cases on the merits,205 but they are given considerable
authority to influence proceedings in the trial court after remand.206 Most
importantly, a trial judge “cannot, over objection, vacate, set aside, or modify
pretrial court orders”—including those related to the admissibility of expert
testimony—without the written concurrence of the pretrial judge.207
The MDL panel also has the power to retransfer pending cases from one
pretrial court to another.208 This rule is primarily aimed at situations where
the pretrial judge is no longer available (e.g., because the judge was voted
out of office),209 but the rule also gives the MDL panel discretion to retransfer

line rule, cases involving complicated, numerous, or significant common fact questions are more likely
to be considered related.” In re State Farm Lloyds Hidalgo Cnty. Hail Storm Litig., 434 S.W.3d 350, 353
(Tex. J.P.M.L. 2014).
199
Tex. Opioids Litig., supra note 198, at 4; see also In re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litig.,
516 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2016) (holding that the relatedness inquiry of Texas Rule of Judicial
Administration 13 does not require that common questions of fact predominate).
200
TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(a). Ordinarily when former, senior, or retired judges are assigned to
cases in trial court, each party is allowed one objection, which, if exercised, bars that judge from hearing
the case. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b) (West 2019). But no such objections are allowed when
the MDL panel transfers cases to a former or retired pretrial judge that has been approved by the chief
justice. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(a). The rules also permit the Panel to assign an MDL to multiple
judges, which it has done on three occasions. See In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig.,
481 S.W.3d 422, 425 & n.4 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2015); In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig. 2,
506 S.W.3d 803, 804 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2016); In re Chesapeake Barnett Royalty Litig., Admin. Order No.
15-0113, 2015 BL 107413, at 1 (Tex. J.P.M.L. Apr. 8, 2015).
201
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West 2019); TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(b).
202
TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.2(d)–(e).
203
Id. r. 13.6(b).
204
Id. r. 13.6(c).
205
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West 2019).
206
See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.8(a)–(b).
207
Id. r. 13.8(b).
208
Id. r. 13.3(o).
209
See Hearing of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, supra note 187, at 9230.
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cases in service of justice and efficiency.210 Regarding this discretion, the
first chair of the Texas MDL panel remarked that retransfer would allow the
panel to take an MDL away from a judge “who is not getting the job done.”211
3. The Data
The Texas judicial branch does not produce MDL-specific data, so we
examined the dockets of all MDL cases listed on the Texas panel’s website.212
This website appears to offer a comprehensive list of all cases in which any
party has sought state MDL treatment in Texas.213 The results presented
below are based on our coding of these docket sheets, with some reference
to other publicly available information about the cases and the judges
assigned to handle them.
a. Petitions and dispositions
From its inception in 2003 until October 2019, the Texas MDL panel
received 98 requests to consolidate cases into an MDL. The Panel granted
61 motions and denied 32 motions, with 5 not ruled upon.214 Among decided
motions, Texas has a 66% grant rate, which is lower than the federal MDL
grant rate for most of its history but somewhat higher than the federal grant
rate in recent years.215
b. Case type
We next categorized the subject matter of the 61 granted petitions,
relying on case names, descriptions in the motion or transfer order, and
secondary sources. Our results are presented in Figure 4 below.
Almost one-third of Texas MDLs addressed weather-related insurance
litigation (20 of 61). Although Texas does not provide data on the number of
cases within MDLs, we have reason to believe that weather-related insurance

210

TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(o).
See Hearing of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, supra note 187, at 9223 (statement of
Judge David Peeples); see also id. at 9228 (characterizing retransfer as potentially helpful to justice and
efficiency).
212
See Available Multidistrict Litigation Cases, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/
about-texas-courts/multi-district-litigation-panel/available-multidistrict-litigation-cases [https://perma.cc
/4ULA-GVDY].
213
See E-mail from Claudia Jenks, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, to Ashley
Arrington (Aug. 26, 2019, 4:04 PM CDT) (on file with journal).
214
Full dataset on file with authors. Of those 5 undecided motions, 3 are pending at the time of
writing, 1 was removed to federal court, and 1 was stayed by a federal bankruptcy court.
215
See Clopton & Bradt, Party Preferences, supra note 3, at 1723–24 (finding the federal grant rate
from 2012 to 2016 to be 57.7%); Williams & George, supra note 3, at 433 (finding the federal grant rate
from 1968 to 2012 to be roughly 70%–80%).
211
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claims also make up a substantial share of Texas MDL measured by cases.216
Additionally, the Panel granted 14 (23%) products liability petitions, 11
(18%) mass-accident petitions, and another 3 (5%) miscellaneous tort
petitions (medical malpractice, defamation, and barratry), for a total of 46%
of granted petitions sounding in tort law. Other granted petitions addressed
consumer law, oil and gas law, employment law, investor or corporate law,
and life insurance. Texas does not appear to have consolidated any public
law cases,217 though it has consolidated suits brought by the state attorney
general together with private claims over the state’s objections.218
FIGURE 4: TEXAS MDLS BY CASE TYPE
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We also compared Texas MDLs to federal MDLs pending in February
2021 (and displayed in Figure 3 above).219 About one-third of federal MDLs
are products liability cases, while those types of MDLs are less than onequarter of Texas’s. Weather-related insurance claims are rare in federal MDL
216

For more, see Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 380–83.
Cf. supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing California and citing a source on federal
MDL). The Texas panel has rebuffed several efforts to consolidate challenges to various local
governments’ tax appraisal practices.
218
For examples, see the Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litigation and the Texas Opioid Litigation. See
In re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litig., 516 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2016); In re Tex. Opioid
Litig., No. 18-0358, 2018 BL 211039, at *2 (Tex. J.P.M.L. June 13, 2018).
219
See Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 382.
217
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but account for one-third of Texas MDLs. Mass-accident cases make up a
substantially larger share of Texas MDL proceedings than federal MDLs,
18% versus 1%.220
c. Districts and judges
As with California, we analyzed the districts and judges handling Texas
MDLs, and we provide many of the results in Appendix C.
Like California, Texas MDL is largely, though not exclusively, a
creature of large population centers, with a mix of repeat players and new
MDL judges. The county with the most MDLs by far was the state’s most
populous county, Harris County (home to Houston), but MDLs were also
created in small counties. And while four judges have handled four or more
MDLs, many MDLs are assigned to first-time pretrial judges.221 Texas
appoints a smaller proportion of female MDL pretrial judges (28%) than the
proportion of female Texas trial judges overall (37%), though we hasten to
add that Texas trial judges are substantially more likely to be women than
federal district judges (37% in Texas to 28% in the federal courts).222
Party affiliation is salient in Texas, where judges are elected in partisan
elections. The five members of the MDL panel are appointed by the chief
justice of Texas, who is elected in a statewide partisan election. Since the
Texas MDL procedure began, the chief justice has always been a
Republican. In that time, the chief justice has always selected a panel with a
majority of Republican judges, including recent panels with all five members
being Republican.223
Party label does not, however, appear to be a major driver in the
selection of pretrial judges, whose political parties are about evenly split. In
fact, the Panel has appointed slightly more Democrats than Republicans as
pretrial judges. These results hold even during recent years when Texas has
had an all-Republican panel.224

220

Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1317.
See infra Appendix C.
222
For more information on the Texas results and methods, see infra Appendix C. For demographic
data on federal judges, see Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-present: Advanced
Search Criteria, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search
[https://perma.cc/2C2C-CPTL].
223
Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 387–88.
224
This also tracks the federal experience, where a skewed panel appointed roughly even numbers
of Democratic- and Republican-appointed transferee judges. See Clopton & Bradt, supra note 3, at 1718,
1737.
221
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d. Retransfer
One particularly notable feature of Texas MDL is Rule 13.3(o), which
allows the MDL panel to retransfer cases from one pretrial judge to another
pretrial judge. The rule contemplates several reasons for retransfer, such as
when the original pretrial judge has resigned or been defeated in an election,
but it also allows the panel to act “in other circumstances when retransfer
will promote the just and efficient conduct of the cases.”225
There were 17 MDLs where the Panel has retransferred cases, including
5 in which the MDL was retransferred twice.226 Although the rule allows the
panel to retransfer cases away from an active judge, the panel does not seem
to have used its ability to remove an MDL from a pretrial judge “who is not
getting the job done.”227 Instead, 12 of the 22 retransfers appear to have been
prompted by the pretrial judge’s retirement, resignation, recusal, or
ascendance to higher office. The other 10 retransfers occurred after the
pretrial judge lost an election.228
Because retransfer after election presents unique considerations, we
examined those 10 retransfers separately. Although one might expect these
MDLs to be assigned to the electoral victor, the panel did not assign any of
these cases to the newly elected judge. Texas law permits approved former
judges to handle MDLs,229 and in 6 of the 10 cases in which a pretrial judge
lost an election, the panel retransferred the MDL back to the pretrial judge
who was voted out. On the 4 other occasions, the panel retransferred cases
to other judges in the same county.230
e. Parallel federal MDLs
Finally, we looked at whether Texas state MDLs had parallel federal
MDLs. The Texas MDL panel has noted on several occasions that the
existence of federal MDL supports creating a state MDL.231 We searched the
225

TEX R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(o).
Results on file with authors. Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 388.
227
Cf. supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting Judge Peeples’s concern with the ability of the
panel to remove judges who are “not getting the job done”).
228
Results on file with authors. Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 388.
229
See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(a).
230
Results on file with authors. Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 389.
231
See, e.g., In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 286 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Tex.
J.P.M.L. 2007) (finding the federal JPML’s reasoning for centralizing cases with similar facts to be
“informative”); In re Ford Motor Co. Speed Control Deactivation Switch Litig., 285 S.W.3d 185, 192
(Tex. J.P.M.L. 2008) (noting that the cases “share similar common fact issues” with the federal cases and
that “[t]he reasoning of the federal panel is consistent with ours”); In re Texas Opioid Litig., No. 180358, 2018 BL 211039, at *1, *3 (Tex. J.P.M.L. June 13, 2018) (explaining that centralizing would “make
it easier to coordinate with the federal MDL”).
226
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federal JPML database on Westlaw for key words and parties in the Texas
MDL captions and tried to match the cases as best we could, relying on the
transfer orders and other publicly available sources.
At least 13 Texas MDLs (21%) had parallel federal MDLs.232 Twelve
of the 13 parallel MDLs (92%) involved products liability claims. The 1 nonproducts liability Texas MDL with a parallel federal MDL involved
consumer claims.233
C. Indiana
1. History
Indiana civil procedure has a peculiar history.234 The Indiana
constitution empowered the Indiana Supreme Court to make rules of
procedure, and the legislature echoed this authorization in a 1937 statute.235
Yet for decades, the Indiana Supreme Court simply did not promulgate a
complete set of civil rules.236 That was the case until 1969, when the
legislature enacted rules of civil procedure by statute to go into effect on
January 1, 1970.237 This apparently motivated the Indiana Supreme Court;
and on July 29, 1969, the court promulgated its own “similar but not
identical” rules, also to be effective January 1, 1970.238 The legislature later
codified the judge-made rules in what has been called “wholly superfluous
legislation.”239
The original 1970 court rules included the common provisions for
consolidation modeled on Federal Rule 42 but did not include any MDL-like
rule.240 Sometime thereafter, it seems that demand for some sort of
consolidation procedure grew. As the Indiana Supreme Court would later
explain, Indiana’s MDL rule “was designed to resolve conflicts that arise

232

One of the thirteen parallel federal MDLs was consolidated in a federal district court in Texas.
Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 383–84. For three idiosyncratic cases in which
the Texas Panel declined to consolidate state cases despite a federal MDL, see id. at 383–84, 383 n.112.
234
See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1395 (1986); Charles Alan Wright, Procedural
Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 98 (1959); Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, supra note 121,
at 50.
235
Oakley & Coon, supra note 234, at 1395 n.141; Wright, supra note 234, at 98.
236
Oakley & Coon, supra note 234, at 1395 n.141; Wright, supra note 234, at 98.
237
Oakley & Coon, supra note 234, at 1395 n.141.
238
Id.
239
See id.
240
See id. at 1395.
233
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‘[w]hen civil actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
in different courts.’”241
Although records are scarce—not uncommon for judicial rulemaking in
the states242—it appears that the Indiana Supreme Court was considering
creating a peer MDL system in 1989, if not earlier.243 The initial proposal
was to add a rule that would permit the consolidation of actions involving
common questions of law or fact pending in different courts. This proposal
was forwarded to the Indiana Supreme Court Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, which offered two meaningful changes. First, the original
proposal provided for sua sponte consolidation, but the committee
recommended that parties should be required to request consolidation.244 The
committee explained that “[t]he purpose of the revision is to prevent a court
from acting on its own to effect consolidation.”245 The supreme court
accepted this recommendation.246 Second, the committee recommended
adding language to the rule, providing that cases were to be remanded to the
original courts unless the consolidating court concluded that they involved
unusual or complicated issues—in other words, a presumption of
consolidation for pretrial purposes only, but an option for the MDL court to
exercise discretion to keep cases for trial.247 The supreme court accepted this
recommendation as well.248
On November 13, 1989, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted Rule
42(D), making it effective on January 1, 1990.249 The rule today is, for all
practical purposes, the same as in 1990.250

241
State ex rel. Curley v. Lake Cir. Ct., 899 N.E.2d 1271, 1272 (Ind. 2008) (quoting IND. R. TRIAL
P. 42(D)).
242
Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, supra note 121, at 35–36.
243
See IND. SUP. CT. COMM. ON R. PRAC. & PROC., COMMITTEE MINUTES (Aug. 25, 1989)
[hereinafter MINUTES] (on file with journal).
244
See id.
245
Id. But see Appellant’s Brief at 7, Farno v. Ansure Mortuaries of Ind., LLC, 953 N.E.2d 1253
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (No. 41A05-1002-PL-00104) (suggesting that the trial court had consolidated cases
sua sponte).
246
Order Amending Rules of Trial Procedure (Ind. 1989) [hereinafter Order] (on file with journal).
247
MINUTES, supra note 243. It is unclear whether the original proposal did not provide for remand
at all or provided for remand without this option. All we can tell from the scant minutes is that the
Committee recommend the remand-with-option language.
248
Order, supra note 246.
249
Id.
250
Compare IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D), with Order, supra note 246 (reflecting minimal differences).
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2. Consolidation Procedure
Indiana’s peer MDL procedure begins with a Rule 42(D) motion to
consolidate.251 When civil actions in different courts share common issues of
law or fact, any party to any of the actions may request consolidation.252 The
moving party must file the motion in the court with the first-filed action.253
Although the rule specifies that parties must request consolidation, there is
at least some evidence that Indiana trial courts have consolidated cases sua
sponte,254 directly contradicting the intent of the committee’s revision.255
The court receiving the motion has the discretion to decide whether
consolidation is appropriate. Technically, the rule provides that the court
“shall enter an order . . . unless good cause to the contrary is shown and
found by the court to exist,”256 but the Indiana Court of Appeals has remarked
that “the decision to consolidate is purely discretionary and will not be
overturned absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”257 The first-filed court,
though, retains its ability to stay or dismiss its case, which then hands
consolidation authority over to the court with the next-earliest-filed action.258
Like federal MDL, Indiana Rule 42(D) specifies that consolidation is
for “discovery and any pre-trial proceedings.”259 However, unlike federal
MDL, Indiana Rule 42(D) also specifies an escape hatch. The consolidated
court may enter an order consolidating cases for trial if “the action involves
unusual or complicated issues of fact or law or involves a substantial
question of law of great public importance.”260 This determination is left to
the court hearing the consolidated proceeding.261 Further empowering the
first-filed court, Rule 42(D) also formally suspends the normal ability of a
party to seek a change of venue during the consolidated proceeding.262 So,

251

IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D); see also Stern v. Gresk, 583 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D).
253
Id. The rule also specifies how to determine which action is filed first. See id.
254
See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, supra note 245, at 7 (“On June 30, 2009, the Johnson Circuit Court
sua sponte ordered the Class Action consolidated for trial purposes with the other three actions . . . .”).
255
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
256
IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D) (emphasis added).
257
City of New Haven v. Allen Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 694 N.E.2d 306, 313 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998).
258
IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D); see also Est. of Hamblen v. Jewell, 772 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002).
259
IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D).
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.; see also Stern v. Gresk, 583 N.E.2d 178, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a litigant
could not seek change of venue during consolidation period).
252
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unlike a federal MDL judge, it is possible for an Indiana judge to preside
over all consolidated cases through trial.
3. The “Data”
As with California and Texas, we endeavored to collect data on the use
of state MDL in Indiana. However, after substantial conversations with
various state officials, we determined that Indiana does not keep any
statewide records on the use of the Rule 42(D) consolidation procedure. As
discussed in more detail below, this is consistent with our impressions of
peer MDL overall.
Westlaw includes fewer than twenty decisions discussing Rule 42(D)
since its adoption,263 but this likely understates the frequency with which the
rule is invoked. Rule 42(D) is implemented by trial court order, and such
orders are not routinely published. This suggests to us that peer MDL
procedures will tend to be less transparent than institutional ones.
In any event, in the absence of “big data,” we report here on some
illuminating “anecdata.” The Rule 42(D) cases address many different
subjects, including family law, securities law, corporate and business law,
property law, election law, and insurance law.264 Among these, Indiana courts
consolidated public law cases related to early voting in the 2008 election265
as well as public and private securities claims.266
In addition, the following exemplary case highlights some salient
features of Rule 42(D).267 Warren Buchanan filed a class action in Parke
Circuit Court against Penn Central Corporation and U.S. Railroad Vest
Corporation, seeking “to quiet title to [an] abandoned railroad right-of-way”
on behalf of all affected landowners throughout the state.268 A couple months
later, Fern Firestone filed a similar class action in Hamilton County, but also
included additional claims of conversion, fraud, and racketeering.269 Two
months after that, Buchanan filed a motion to amend his complaint to include
the same additional claims, and on the same day the trial court preliminarily

263

Results on file with authors.
Results on file with authors.
265
State ex rel. Curley v. Lake Cir. Ct., 899 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. 2008); cf. supra notes 173, 217 and
accompanying text (discussing public law cases in California and lack thereof in Texas and federal MDL).
266
Farno v. Ansure Mortuaries of Ind., LLC, 953 N.E.2d 1253, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
267
The following is drawn from a series of published decisions on the litigation, including State ex
rel. Firestone v. Parke Cir. Ct., 621 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind. 1993); Hefty v. All Other Members of the Certified
Settlement Class, 680 N.E.2d 843 (Ind. 1997).
268
See Firestone, 621 N.E.2d at 1114.
269
See id. at 1114 & n.1.
264

1696

115:1649 (2021)

MDL in the States

approved a class action settlement with Buchanan as class counsel.270 Upon
learning of the settlement, Firestone unsuccessfully sought to intervene in
the Buchanan action and, at the same time, obtained certification of his
separate statewide class in the Hamilton action.271 Buchanan then went back
to the first-filed court and obtained an order under Rule 42(D) consolidating
the actions in Parke and dissolving the Hamilton certification order.272 The
Rule 42(D) consolidation was appealed all the way up to the Indiana
Supreme Court, which eventually approved of the first-filed judge’s use of
the rule.273
The parties continued to litigate the merits of the settlements,274 but the
role of Rule 42(D) was clear. On the one hand, Rule 42(D) helped avoid
inconsistent rulings and dueling class actions by consolidating the lawsuit
into a single proceeding. On the other hand, Rule 42(D) essentially chose
winners and losers—it empowered the first-filed judge in the Parke Circuit
Court to decide whether to absorb the Hamilton County action, and in so
doing, to reward Buchanan at the expense of Firestone. And it gave the firstfiled judge the exclusive power to approve and enforce a class action
settlement that would resolve a statewide dispute and essentially wipe out
the other consolidated claims.
D. Other States
Finally, although we have not worked up full case studies on all states’
MDL procedures, we report here our best efforts to determine the frequency
with which states have used them. This information is drawn from all thirteen
institutional MDL states (as of fall 2020). The information provided was not
always in the same form, making apples-to-apples comparisons difficult. But
the brief sketch below provides some context:



California’s MDL is the most frequently used, hearing at least
223 motions (and granting 163) in the last five and a half
years.275
Colorado received about 224 petitions during the last ten
years.276

270

Id.
See Hefty, 680 N.E.2d at 847.
272
See Firestone, 621 N.E.2d at 1114–15.
273
See id. at 1115.
274
Hefty, 680 N.E.2d at 851–57.
275
See supra Section II.A.3 (describing sources and data).
276
COLO. JUD. BRANCH, COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2019, at 5, https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Administration/Planning_and_Analysis/
271
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Illinois granted 50 petitions since 2014.277
Texas received 98 petitions and granted 61 since 2003.278
Minnesota received 62 petitions and granted 32 since 2003.279
Kansas received 15 petitions and granted 9 since 2009.280
New York consolidated at least 24 cases since 2002.281
New Jersey has 23 pending MDLs.282
West Virginia had 11 pending MDLs as of 2018.283
The Virginia supreme court has only formed a panel to decide
on MDL four times in its history.284
In North Carolina, the chief justice has created 2 pending
MDLs (comprising 11 and 2 cases respectively).285
Representatives of the Connecticut and Oregon judiciaries
indicate that their systems are rarely if ever used. In the fall of
2019, the Connecticut courts reported that the current chief
court administrator had never used the authority,286 and the
Oregon Supreme Court reported that it had not used its power
since at least 2006.287

Annual_Statistical_Reports/2019/FY2019AnnualReportFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YLE-UMVG].
We say “about” because we are relying on reports from ten fiscal years, rather than calendar years.
277
These data were provided by the Illinois Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. On file with authors.
278
See supra Section II.B.3 (describing sources and data).
279
These data are based on a report provided to authors by the Minnesota State Law Library, crossreferenced with the Case Management System, MINN. APP. CTS., http://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us/
ctrack/publicLogin.jsp [https://perma.cc/JM3S-5KGT].
280
These data are based on information provided by the Kansas Clerk of the Appellate Courts. On
file with authors.
281
We compiled these results from Decisions of the Litigation Coordinating Panel, N.Y. STATE
UNIFIED
C T.
SYS.,
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/supctmanh/LCP/Decisionslist.shtml
[https://perma.cc/NF3G-K53Z], and underlying documents in each of the listed cases. We also confirmed
with the First Judicial District that this list was comprehensive and up-to-date.
282
See Multicounty Litigation, N.J. CTS., https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/mcl/index.html
[https://perma.cc/F4Q5-9RBZ].
283
See W. VA. JUDICIARY, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MASS LITIGATION PANEL,
http://www.courtswv.gov/lower-courts/mlp/2018AnnualReport-MassLitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ANA3-TCXV].
284
This result was provided to authors by the Virginia State Law Library, Supreme Court of Virginia.
On file with journal.
285
This information was provided to authors by the Supreme Court of North Carolina; see also N.C.
ADMIN. OFF. CTS., REPORT ON NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS COURT, N.C.G.S. 7A-343(8A) (2020) (on
file with journal) (providing general information on the court’s business). It is possible that other cases
were consolidated automatically (i.e., without chief justice intervention) under other North Carolina
procedures, but we were unable to gather any relevant data on such cases.
286
On file with journal.
287
On file with journal.
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We also tried to gather this sort of data for peer MDL states using
similar methods, though we were not able to obtain any meaningful results.
The most common response was that the statewide authorities that typically
house state court data do not collect this local court information. Perhaps not
surprisingly, decentralizing the consolidation decisions to local courts also
makes it more difficult to get a clear picture of what is happening across the
state. Systemic transparency, in other words, may be lost in peer MDL.
Finally, we also studied the role of state MDLs in a single large dispute:
the opioid litigation. (We report these results in full in a separate article.288)
While the federal opioid MDL has garnered most of the headlines,289 our
findings further highlight the important role of state MDLs in nationwide
disputes. When Purdue Pharma declared bankruptcy during the pendency of
the litigation, it asked a federal bankruptcy court to stay pending lawsuits
against it.290 Although the majority of such suits were in the federal MDL,
more than 400 cases were pending in state courts in almost every state.291
And of those cases, more than three-quarters were consolidated in state
MDLs in a mix of institutional and peer states.292
III. ASSESSMENT
The previous Parts created a taxonomy of state MDLs and delved more
deeply into some examples. This Part is a first cut at making something of
those findings.
We resist the temptation, though, to reach normative conclusions such
as “Texas good, California bad.” Such assessments are simply not possible
at this point: we lack comparable data among states, and there are no
consensus metrics that could guide comparisons even if we had those data.
Indeed, it would not be unreasonable for lawmakers to weigh the potential
purposes of consolidation differently such that different MDL procedures
would be better for different states.293

288
See generally Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, supra note 14, at 4–22 (collecting
information on state-court opioid cases and analyzing those results).
289
See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/6TSYTDEY] (describing federal MDL judge Dan Aaron Polster).
290
See Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 25–26, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649 (RDD)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2019).
291
See Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs supra note 14, at 4–5.
292
See id. (collecting data and sources).
293
Even with respect to normatively charged concepts such as “forum shopping,” there is no
agreement about optimal levels. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum
Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 579 (2016) (discussing the unappreciated functions of forum
shopping).
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If we think about our survey as a menu of options, however, then it is
valuable to assess the tradeoffs inherent in these different institutional-design
choices. On first glance, the proliferation of state MDLs brings to mind other
innovations in court design through which jurisdictions compete for judicial
business. In Section A, we explain why interjurisdictional competition is a
surprisingly poor fit for state MDLs. Upon reflection, it makes more sense
to think about state MDLs primarily within the context of intrastate political
economy and political authority—and to think about the choices among state
MDL designs along these dimensions. In Section B, we explore state choices
about MDLs in the context of competition between plaintiff and defendant
interests. In Section C, we consider the impact of state MDLs on judicial
authority and political accountability. Although we think that state MDLs
are products of these intrastate dynamics, they also have potential effects for
cases that have state–federal or state–state components. In Section D, we
consider the role of state MDL in the potential competition between federal
and state actors within disputes. Finally, in Section E we explain how state
MDLs can be fertile ground for cooperation across state lines and among
federal and state judges when resolving large controversies.
A. Interstate Political Economy?
With fifty state judiciaries and the federal courts as candidates for
complex litigation, there would seem to be ample opportunity for
jurisdictional competition, or so-called “forum selling.”294 In a leading
article, Professors Daniel Klerman and Greg Reilly observe: “For diverse
motives, such as prestige, local benefits, or re-election, some judges want to
hear more of certain types of cases. When plaintiffs have a wide choice of
forum, such judges have incentives to make the law more pro-plaintiff
because plaintiffs choose the court with the most pro-plaintiff law and
procedures.”295 From common law claims in early modern England to patent
cases in the Eastern District of Texas, Klerman and Reilly (and others)

294
Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 245, 299–300 (2016); see
also Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141,
1146 (2006); LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 138 (2005); J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent
Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 634 (2015); Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great
Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015); John F.
Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1959 (2012); Daniel
Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179,
1179 (2007) (emphasizing that the English common law system incentivized jurisdictional competition).
295
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 294, at 242.
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observe jurisdictional competition across a range of areas.296 And many
scholars and policymakers have explained the rise of “business courts” by
reference to this form of competition.297
One might think that the sorts of complex disputes that make up many
MDL proceedings would be prime candidates for forum selling. Complex
cases can generate revenue for local lawyers and service providers. And
federal judges, at least, tend to view MDL assignments as prestigious and
desirable for a variety of reasons.298 Could states, therefore, be competing
with each other for the kind of complex litigation that ends up in MDL?
We don’t think so. First, our study of the legislative history of MDL in
California, Texas, and Indiana, is consistent with the view that jurisdictional
competition was not a primary driver.299 We also observe, though without
scientific rigor, that the most well-developed consolidation procedures
mostly have arisen in states that seemingly have the most cases to
consolidate, consistent with the idea that consolidation serves other goals.300
Conceptually, we also think it is unlikely that interstate competition
drives the adoption or design of state MDL. The primary concern of forumselling critics is that courts will try to attract business by appealing to
plaintiffs and their attorneys.301 The current rules of federal jurisdiction,
however, mean that most cases worth competing over—cases with some
interstate elements and large possible recoveries—are also going to be
candidates for federal jurisdiction, especially since the Class Action Fairness
Act was adopted in 2005.302 So even if a state were to make its MDL process
extremely friendly to plaintiffs, attempts to forum shop into that state would

296

See supra note 294 (collecting sources).
See generally Coyle, supra note 294 (evaluating the design of business courts).
298
See Gluck, supra note 3, at 1698.
299
See supra Sections II.A.1, II.B.1, II.C.1.
300
See supra Section I.A. As a very rough proxy, states with larger populations are more likely to
have MDL systems. Among states in the top quartile by population, only Florida, Ohio, and Georgia have
no form of MDL (and Ohio has actively considered one). Among the bottom quartile by population, only
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and West Virginia have state MDLs (and only West Virginia’s is
an institutional MDL). Compare supra Section I.A (listing states by MDL form), with Vintage 2019
Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://www.census.gov/search-results.html?q=
2020+population+estimates+by+state&page=1&stateGeo=none&searchtype=web&cssp=SERP&_chars
et_=UTF-8 [https://perma.cc/N8HB-QE56] (consolidating tables of state population estimates).
301
See supra note 294 (collecting sources).
302
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (arising under jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (CAFA). This is
especially true given recent decisions finding that some state MDLs are “mass actions” removable under
CAFA. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
297
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likely be met with a defendant’s notice of removal to federal court.303 To be
sure, there will be cases amenable to jurisdiction in multiple states and for
which removal would be unavailable,304 but we suspect this group of cases is
small enough that it would be unlikely to drive competition-based law
reform.305 And that group of cases may be getting even smaller in the wake
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent cases constricting personal jurisdiction.306
We also do not think that states are likely competing with each other
for MDL’s repeat players. Critics of federal MDL worry that consolidation
favors institutional defendants and the most powerful plaintiffs’ attorneys
over small-time players.307 Regardless of whether this account of federal
MDL is correct, there are at least two reasons to doubt that there is interstate
competition for these repeat players. First, the institutional players at the
center of this narrative prefer centralization, so federal MDL—which offers
nationwide, not just statewide, consolidation—is almost always going to win
out.308 Second, even if a state could develop a repeat-player-friendly MDL,
that state could not pull in cases filed in other states, which is exactly where
nonrepeat players would file suit in this hypothetical world.309 In other words,
the lack of a 28 U.S.C. § 1407 equivalent for coordinating state court cases

303

28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446.
See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 741–46 (2014) (holding that
state parens patriae actions are not “mass actions” for purposes of CAFA).
305
For example, even though state attorney general (AG) suits might avoid CAFA, see id., and even
though state AGs may sue in other states’ courts, see Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement,
70 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1096–1101 (2018), we expect that most AGs prefer to sue in their home courts.
306
See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–82 (2017) (limiting
specific personal jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125–33 (2014) (limiting general
personal jurisdiction); Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms, supra note 88, at 1272–74
(arguing that the Court’s attempts to limit personal jurisdiction will drive more cases into federal MDL).
Personal jurisdiction is not a limit for federal MDL in any given state because MDL courts can rely on
personal jurisdiction from the transferor court. Id. at 1296; see also Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of
Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1172 (2018) (explaining the JPML’s view that
the transferor court’s personal jurisdiction reach is controlling).
307
See generally, e.g., Burch, Monopolies, supra note 3 (arguing that repeat players, including
defendants and lead plaintiffs’ lawyers, may prioritize positive outcomes for each other to the detriment
of plaintiffs); Mullenix, supra note 3 (arguing that plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel have a shared
interest in exploiting the MDL structure to resolve disputes outside class action restraints). But see
generally Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves,” supra note 3, (arguing that repeat-player
plaintiffs’ lawyers can serve as a valuable counterweight to repeat players on the defense side).
308
This preference for centralized federal MDL is the point of the criticisms just mentioned.
309
Nonrepeat players might face additional transaction costs in filing in a different court, but we
suspect that those costs would not typically be so large that they would deter nonrepeat players from
fleeing a jurisdiction that overtly caters to repeat players.
304
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across state lines means that states would be less successful at centralizing
disputes than the federal courts, even if they tried.310
In short, therefore, interstate competition does not seem all that relevant
to state MDL. Instead, we think that more important effects are likely within
each state (where we turn next) or between state and federal courts (where
we turn thereafter).
B. Intrastate Forum Shopping
States’ choices about their MDL systems can have consequences for
intrastate political economy. In particular, state MDLs may affect the
competition between plaintiffs and defendants. While we do not observe
state MDLs applying specialized rules of procedure that overtly favor
plaintiffs or defendants,311 seemingly neutral design choices can have the
effect of tilting the balance between them.
Most importantly, state MDL rules have consequences for the ability of
plaintiffs and defendants to shop for judges. Especially given the degree of
discretion that trial judges typically have in handling pretrial matters and
managing attorney appointments in complex cases, the identity of the MDL
judge may swamp many of the differences in procedure that we have
observed.312 This is all the more so because most complex cases settle before
any of the judge’s pretrial rulings can be appealed. From the litigants’
perspective, the big question will typically be, “Who is the judge that will be
handling this mass of cases?”313
Going back to our initial taxonomy, there is a big difference between
states that have peer MDLs and states that have institutional MDLs. In short,
the peer MDL models often give plaintiffs more leeway to shop for a
favorable forum and judge than when no MDL is available. The institutional

310
We have explained why states are unlikely to compete by favoring plaintiffs or by favoring big
players. If a state competed by creating a dispute resolution system that maximized everyone’s
preferences, then all we could do is applaud.
311
Cf. Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1311–14, 1325–32 (discussing and criticizing
proposals for federal MDL-specific rules of procedure).
312
Parties may also care about the venue to the extent that it affects the jury pool in cases for which
a jury would be available. We focus on the selection of judges here in part because the selection of judge
implies a selection of venue.
313
In recounting Representative John Dingell’s famous quote, “I’ll let you write the substance . . .
you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time,” to his students, Professor Oscar Chase
used to add the proviso, “Sure, as long as you let me pick the judges.” (author’s personal recollection).
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MDL models, by contrast, generally give plaintiffs less leeway to forum
shop.314
In the seven states with peer MDL procedures,315 trial judges with
pending cases are the ones who decide whether and where cases will be
consolidated. Thus, the decider on the consolidation question will always be
a judge in a court where some plaintiff has chosen to file a case. And
seemingly in all of the peer states, cases may only be transferred to courts in
which a case is pending—again, a set of courts over which plaintiffs have
some say.
We assume that plaintiffs and their lawyers will behave strategically in
light of these features. If plaintiffs’ lawyers coordinate with each other (or
just think ahead), they can file cases in venues with friendly judges, and then
ask the friendliest of those judges to consolidate cases from around the state
either in their own court or in front of another friendly judge. Careful
plaintiffs’ lawyers could also delay filing in less favorable venues until after
the consolidation decision is made, and then argue that their later filed cases
should tag along with the earlier transferred cases. Some peer MDL states
give plaintiffs the option for even more control. In states where the judge in
the earliest filed action decides whether and where to consolidate (Indiana,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania),316 plaintiffs’ lawyers can make sure to file
the first case in the friendliest venue, and then ask that judge to vacuum up
later filed cases from around the state.
There are limits, of course, to plaintiffs’ ability to forum shop in these
peer states. Venue rules and random judicial case assignments within courts
provide important constraints. Plaintiffs with similar claims are not always
careful or coordinated enough to make sure early cases are filed in friendly
forums. And in jurisdictions in which a consolidation motion may be filed in
any pending case, defendants might request consolidation in the most
defendant-friendly venue. But the important point for our purposes is that the
peer MDL model gives plaintiffs some greater degree of control over who
will decide whether to consolidate the cases and, if so, in front of which
judge.
In the institutional MDL model, by contrast, the decider on the critical
question of whether and where to consolidate cases is some institution other
than a trial judge with pending cases.317 Some states follow the federal model
314
To the extent that ad hoc MDL is the product of state high court decision-making, ad hoc states
will behave like institutional states, though other ad hoc approaches are possible. See supra Section I.A.
315
See supra Section I.A (describing these states).
316
See infra Table 4.
317
See supra Section I.A (describing these states).
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and give the panel the authority to handpick a specific judge.318 Other states
disaggregate the forum and judge choices.319 But no matter the details, all of
these institutional MDL states depart from random assignment320 and
empower some external institution to handpick the judge who will handle
the consolidated actions. And that means that plaintiffs lose some of their
ability to shop for a friendly judge to handle the consolidated actions or a
friendly judge to decide who that judge will be.321 Indeed, opponents of
Texas’s institutional MDL provision argued that it “would allow defendants
to ‘forum shop,’ which [MDL’s] supporters say plaintiffs should not be
allowed to do.”322
One can see the consequences of the peer–institutional choice most
starkly in geographically polarized states with elected judges.323 Assume that
Democratic judges are more plaintiff-friendly than Republican judges, in at
least some types of aggregate cases.324 While this is a gross
oversimplification, it helps illustrate the dynamics that could be at play with
elected judiciaries and the various interests that appear before them.325 Now
318
See supra Section I.B. Indeed, in the federal system, identifying a transferee judge with the
experience and wherewithal to handle a massive litigation is often the most important consideration for
the JPML. See Williams & George, supra note 3, at 439–40 (cataloging reasons for forum and judge
selection); Bradt, supra note 306, at 1168 (“It’s not so much a where question, but a who question.”
(quoting Elizabeth Cabraser, MDL Problems, Proceedings of the Section on Litigation, Annual Meeting
of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 6, 2017) (recording on file with the Association of
American Law Schools))). Cabraser is a prominent MDL practitioner.
319
In New York, the panel picks a transferee court, and then the chief judge of that court chooses a
specific judge to handle the consolidated actions. In California, the chief justice may pick the transferee
judge or delegate that decision to the chief judge of the transferee court. See supra Part I.
320
For a proposal to integrate random assignment into federal MDL, see Clopton, MDL as Category,
supra note 2, at 1340–41 (recommending randomization of transferee judges where no compelling reason
or need for expertise regarding cases exists). For an argument why conscious selection of MDL judges is
attractive in some types of cases, see Francis E. McGovern & D. Theodore Rave, A Hub-and-Spoke Model
of Multidistrict Litigation, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 13–16) (on
file with journal).
321
The descriptions of the California and Texas models and the circuitous path of many cases
demonstrated by this data illustrate the attenuated links between plaintiffs’ forum choice and the
consolidated proceeding. See supra Part II (describing case studies and data).
322
See HOUSE RSCH. ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, HB4, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND TORT LIABILITY
REVISIONS 52 (2003), https://hro.house.texas.gov/pdf/ba78R/HB0004.PDF [https://perma.cc/63GZ2FEW].
323
Certainly, these effects might be visible in other states as well, but these states present particularly
clear contrasts—and, for reasons taken up in the next Section, they also suggest potential tensions with
respect to political control and accountability.
324
Cf. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 40, at 246–47 (finding that a circuit panel’s ideological
composition has a strong influence on the certification outcome in federal cases).
325
No one doubts that some judges have plaintiff-friendly or defendant-friendly reputations, so if
you prefer, substitute “plaintiff-friendly” and “defendant-friendly” for “Democratic” and “Republican.”
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consider Indiana and Texas. Both states are solidly Republican at the
statewide level but have geographic pockets that are heavily Democratic.
Both states elect their trial judges in local partisan elections. Texas also elects
its supreme court justices in statewide partisan elections.326
In a hypothetical Indiana litigation, plaintiffs might strategically file
their first case in heavily Democratic Monroe County, and then file a number
of similar cases throughout the state. Under Indiana’s peer MDL rules, the
plaintiffs can ask the elected trial judge in Monroe County to consolidate all
of the later filed cases statewide in her own court.327 Thus, putative Indiana
plaintiffs can shop for plaintiff-friendly consolidation venues by selecting
where to file the first case. And unless the plaintiff-friendly judge voluntarily
relinquishes the cases, the plaintiffs’ choice will stick.
Compare this result with an analogous case in Texas. Plaintiffs in Texas
might elect to file as many of their cases as possible in the heavily
Democratic Starr County in South Texas.328 But as long as at least one related
case is filed elsewhere in the state, then defendants can ask a panel of judges
appointed by the Republican chief justice to take those cases away from the
Democratic Starr County judges and give them to another judge somewhere
else in the state. Plaintiffs’ ability to select forums and judges is significantly
reduced once a formal panel gets involved.329 And while defendants are not
guaranteed an alternative judge of their choice, an institutional MDL at least
affords them an opportunity to get out of the plaintiff’s chosen forum.
In sum, choices about MDL design have direct consequences for the
perennial competition between plaintiffs and defendants. Peer MDLs
facilitate plaintiff forum shopping and tend to shift power from defendants
to plaintiffs. Conversely, institutional MDLs inhibit plaintiff forum shopping
and tend to shift some power away from plaintiffs toward defendants.
326

Though not a part of peer coordination in Indiana, we note that Indiana’s supreme court justices
are appointed by the governor from a commission-generated list and are subject to retention elections.
See About the Court, COURTS.IN.GOV, https://www.in.gov/courts/supreme/about [https://perma.cc/JB5BZR42].
327
See IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D). An MDL consolidation under Indiana’s Rule of Trial Procedure
42(D) suspends the parties’ right to move for an ordinary venue transfer for as long as the cases are
consolidated. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
328
Starr County and the surrounding counties in the Rio Grande Valley have been perennial favorites
on the American Tort Reform Association’s list of “Judicial Hellholes.” Texas lawyer Tony Buzbee is
reported to have said, “That venue probably adds about 75% to the value of the case . . . . [W]hen you’re
in Starr County, traditionally you need to just show that the guy was working, and he was hurt. And that’s
the hurdle . . . .” See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2008),
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CR5X76EN].
329
Note also that both states depart from the normal allocation of judicial business, which would
involve cases remaining in the courts in which they were filed (subject to an individual motion to transfer
venue).
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C. Intrastate Judicial Politics
The previous section explored the consequences of MDL design for
forum and judge shopping. MDL design also has consequences for the
allocation of judicial authority within a state, and again, the institutional–
peer division is helpful in interrogating these consequences. As we explain,
institutional MDL systems reallocate judicial power within a state vertically,
and peer MDL systems reallocate judicial power within a state horizontally.
Turning first to institutional MDL states, Table 3 below describes the
methods of selecting the MDL decider and trial judges in institutional states.
In every institutional MDL scheme, state-level actors—a panel, the supreme
court, or the chief justice—decide whether and where to consolidate cases.
And those state-level actors often pick the judge who will handle the
consolidated cases. The institutional MDL approach thus reallocates power
vertically from local judges to state-level ones.330
TABLE 3: JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD IN INSTITUTIONAL MDL STATES331

State

MDL Decider

California

Chief justice
(with advice
from designees)

MDL Decider
Selection
Appointed by
governor (with
retention election)

Trial Judge
Selection
Nonpartisan
election
Appointed by
governor (with
local retention
election)

Colorado

Panel

Selected by appointed
chief justice

Connecticut
(hybrid)

Chief court
administrator (or
trial judge or
consent)

Selected by appointed
chief justice

Appointed by
governor

Illinois

Supreme court

Partisan districted
election

Partisan election

330
An important caveat is to be noted. It is, of course, true that states have hierarchical judicial
systems where state-level appellate courts can overrule the decisions of local trial courts. But not all
decisions can or will be subjected to appellate review. This is particularly true in aggregate litigation,
where many of the most important decisions are ones of fact or case management that are committed
firmly to the trial court’s discretion and where most cases settle before any appeal is taken. We assume
that the identity of the trial judge matters and that states that elect trial judges in local elections have made
a conscious choice to devolve the kind of discretion and authority that trial judges wield to the local level.
331
See supra Section I.B; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49 (maintaining information on
MDL decider and trial judge selection in the states).
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State

MDL Decider

MDL Decider
Selection

Kansas

Supreme court

Appointed (with
retention election)

Minnesota

Chief justice

Nonpartisan election

New Jersey

Supreme court

New York

Panel

North
Carolina

Chief justice

Partisan election

Partisan election

Oregon

Supreme court
(chief justice
assigns judge)

Nonpartisan election

Nonpartisan
election

Texas

Panel

Virginia

Panel

West
Virginia

Panel

Appointed by
governor
Selected by chief
administrative judge
appointed by
appointed chief judge

Selected by elected
chief justice
Selected by
legislatively selected
supreme court
Selected by elected
supreme court

Trial Judge
Selection
Mix of partisan
elections and
locally appointed
with retention
elections
Nonpartisan
election
Appointed by
governor
Partisan election

Partisan election
Legislative
selection
Nonpartisan
election

This vertical reallocation of power to state-level institutions is most
pronounced in the states in which the trial judges who are losing power are
themselves tied to local constituencies. As displayed in Table 3, at least ten
institutional states subject trial judges to some form of local election.332 These
states have chosen a system that makes judges accountable to local
constituencies and thus they permit variation among judges across the state.
Locally elected state trial judges are not “fungible” in the same way that we
332
To the extent that appointed trial judges are thought to “represent” local constituencies, then the
same comments apply to them. For example, Colorado and Virginia (among others) require their trial
court appointees to be residents of the relevant jurisdiction. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note
49.
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might think of federal district court judges, who are, by design, not
accountable to any geographic constituency.333 When a state supreme court,
or a panel that it selects, transfers cases from one elected trial judge to
another, it is not simply reallocating judicial business among more-or-less
fungible judges, like in a federal MDL. Instead, institutional state MDL
procedures can stamp out the intrastate variation that is part of the state
system, and they do so only for the subset of cases that qualify for
consolidation.
Particularly in states where judges at all levels are chosen through
partisan elections, it is possible that institutional MDL may become a site of
contestation between state and local political factions. Those instances are
not necessarily limited to situations in which one side is engaged in
aggressive forum shopping.
Returning to our opening case, imagine that there is a major storm in an
institutional MDL state such as Texas, where trial judges are elected locally
and the supreme court chief justice, who selects the MDL panel, is elected
statewide. Now imagine that a mass of lawsuits over insurance claims from
the hardest hit city is pending in front of a moderate Republican (or a
moderately pro-defendant) judge in that city. The judge rules for the
insurance companies, and the public is outraged. In the next election, the
judge is defeated and replaced by a Democratic former plaintiffs’ attorney
who ran on holding insurance companies accountable. A few years later,
there is another storm and another wave of insurance lawsuits. The voters in
that city seem to want the new round of litigation to come out a different
way. But the Texas MDL panel—appointed by the Texas chief justice, a
Republican who was elected statewide—can take those cases away from the
newly elected Democratic judge and assign them to some other solidly
Republican judge elsewhere in the state. (Indeed, at least in Texas, the MDL
panel can do this even in the middle of a case. If an MDL judge is voted out
of office, the panel can retransfer the consolidated cases away from that
judge’s elected successor—and even back to the defeated incumbent!)334 In
333
But see Hearing of the Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. 9305 (Tex. 2003) (statement of Chief Justice
Phillips) (Texas Advisory Committee member and Judge Scott Brister observing that “the concept behind
MDL is that [state] trial judges are fungible, too”).
334
See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(o), 13.6(a) (allowing former judges approved by the chief justice
to serve as MDL judges); supra Section II.B.3. This situation is hardly hypothetical. The insurance
litigation following Hurricane Harvey, for example, was initially assigned to a Republican judge in
Houston. When that judge lost her next election to a Democratic former plaintiffs’ attorney, the Texas
MDL panel retransferred the cases back to the defeated incumbent, who had been approved by the chief
justice to handle MDLs. For a more detailed account, see Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at
391–92, 391 n.143. Indeed, when judges handling MDLs in Texas lose elections, the Texas MDL panel
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such instances, local constituencies might justifiably object to the state panel
interfering with their electoral choices—though MDL defenders might say
that statewide disputes should not be subjected to the whims of one-off local
elections.
More generally, an institutional MDL system may empower statewide
actors to overrule the wishes of locally responsive actors. Sometimes that
may be a valuable check on local impulses run amok; other times it may
reflect a power play by a political faction that is more powerful statewide.
Hopefully, the statewide actors neutrally apply the criteria for deciding when
to consolidate and where;335 however, our cynical sides acknowledge that
such discretionary choices at least create opportunities for other factors to
come into play. Our point here is not to say that local responsiveness and
control are more important than efficiency and statewide uniformity or vice
versa. The point is that those different values are implicated by the states’
institutional choices.336
While the potential conflict in institutional MDL states is vertical, in
peer states, it is horizontal. Recall that peer states empower trial judges with
pending cases to make consolidation decisions. The ability to consolidate
cases from other courts means that trial judges exercise “extraterritorial”
control by reaching outside their districts to grab cases from around the
state.337 This, too, departs from the background distribution of authority in
these state systems. Here, some local actors are empowered at the expense

has uniformly transferred the MDLs away from their elected successors, and often back to the defeated
incumbent. See id.
335
Our study of Texas’s MDL system found little evidence that party label was a major driver in the
MDL panel’s assignment of cases to pretrial judges, but our sample size was small and factors other than
crass partisanship may, of course, be at play. For more on this issue, see Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL,
supra note 10, at 392.
336
Indeed, most voters may not even be aware that their state has an institutional MDL that could
undermine their local judicial choice in some cases. The low salience of state MDL might make it a sort
of procedural backdoor limitation on voters’ rights to elect local judges to hear local cases.
337
This argument has parallels to various arguments in federal law, including arguments in favor of
CAFA and arguments against nationwide injunctions. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M.
Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1415–17 (2006) (connecting CAFA to
extraterritoriality); Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jefferson Sessions III to Heads of Civ. Litigating
Components & U.S. Attorneys at 6 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1093881/download [https://perma.cc/T2JZ-XR3Q] (“A lower court issuing a nationwide
injunction effectively takes away from the other courts any opportunity they might have had to resolve
similar issues pending or soon to come before them.”).
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of other local actors. And notably, the same local actors get to decide which
cases qualify for consolidation in the first place.338
Table 4 summarizes judicial selection methods in states with peer MDL
systems. The potential concern with extraterritorial control seems more acute
in those peer states in which trial judges are elected by local constituencies.
In these states, trial judges are supposed to represent particular jurisdictions,
but the peer MDL systems allow a locally elected judge to exercise control
over cases in other judges’ purviews. The concern seems less acute in states
where trial judges are appointed by statewide actors. In these states, trial
judges may not be designed to be responsive to local interests (and could not
be voted out for going against local sentiment). In that sense they look more
like federal judges.
TABLE 4: JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN PEER MDL STATES339

State

MDL Decider

Trial Judge
Selection

Indiana

First-filed judge

Partisan election

Maine

Any judge with pending case

Massachusetts

First-filed judge

New Hampshire

Any judge with pending case

Pennsylvania

First-filed judge

Partisan election

Rhode Island

Any judge with pending case

Appointed by
governor

Wisconsin

Transferor–transferee joint
decision

Nonpartisan election

Appointed by
governor
Appointed by
governor
Appointed by
governor

Both institutional and peer models of MDL, therefore, are exceptions
to the normal allocation of judicial business in a state. Or, to put it another
way, the model that most closely tracks the background distribution of
judicial authority throughout the state appears to be the states that have no
MDL procedure. If local judges keep control over their cases, then the
designed intrastate variation is preserved. Of course, that model gives up the
338
Wisconsin’s requirement of a joint order blunts this concern by empowering both the sending and
receiving judges, though it seemingly does so at a cost to efficiency. See supra notes 78–79 and
accompanying text.
339
See supra Section I.B; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49 (maintaining information on
MDL decider and trial judge selection in the states).
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efficiency gains of aggregated proceedings. States must decide what degree
of local control and geographic variance they want in their judicial systems
and how much they are willing to trade that off against values like efficiency
and statewide uniformity.
We do not mean to suggest that any particular combination of policies
on local control and MDL design is better than any other. Instead, we want
to emphasize that these are choices and that policymakers should make them
consciously—something that our review of legislative histories suggests that
they do not always do.
D. Federal–State Competition
The foregoing sections suggest that intrastate dynamics are central to
state MDL design choices. And, again, it is worth noting that many state
MDL proceedings involve disputes that are primarily or exclusively within
a state.
But, of course, many large disputes spill over state lines, and although
federal MDLs tend to vacuum up most cases in a mass-tort proceeding, there
continue to be cases with federal and state components.340 As noted above,
we have not found evidence of states adopting or designing MDL procedures
in order to capture a share of these cases.341 Yet even if they were created for
other reasons, we find that the presence of state MDLs can lead to
competition between federal and state proceedings. And, as federal MDL
continues to increase in importance, we suspect that these federal–state
dynamics will become even more important to the complex litigation
landscape.
More precisely, the existence of state MDLs operating alongside a
federal MDL has consequences for the distribution of power within disputes.
When state or federal courts consolidate disputes, there is an accompanying
tendency to consolidate representation. In the typical mass tort, this will
mean consolidating representation on the plaintiffs’ side.342 This could take
the form of formal appointments (e.g., “lead counsel”) or informal efforts
among plaintiffs’ counsel to work together on joint filings.343 Though MDL
does not require such consolidation344—and such consolidation is possible

340
See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms, supra note 88, at 1299–1306
(discussing MDL’s implications and the increased federalization of litigation).
341
See supra Section III.A.
342
See Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms, supra note 88, at 1260.
343
See, e.g., FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 10.22–.221 (2004).
344
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (providing no rules for consolidating representation).
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outside of MDL345—we think that the choice to create MDL procedures in a
state will almost certainly increase the frequency with which this happens.
The costs and benefits of representational consolidation within a single
proceeding are well known and often debated, so we need not rehash them
here.346 But where things get more interesting is when the opportunities for
consolidation exist across multiple court systems addressing the same
dispute. Here, the most striking effects will be when there is a federal MDL
with satellite cases in the states. In a world without state MDLs, those
satellite cases may be scattered across thousands of state courthouses, with
collective-action problems weakening their ability to affect the wider
litigation. But when those disputes may be consolidated in state MDLs, then
the state proceedings have the capacity to become competing power centers
vis-à-vis the federal litigation.347
These competing power centers may help check the considerable power
of lead counsel in the federal MDL if different lawyers take the lead in state
proceedings.348 Indeed, in other work, we find evidence of this dynamic in
345

See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 383–86 (2000) (providing
examples of informal aggregation and analyzing the implications); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A.
Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
961, 1029–30 (1993) (highlighting the courts’ initial use of “ad hoc, informal aggregative procedures” to
manage mass tort litigation before accepting the use of MDL); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)
(discussing the appointment of lead plaintiffs under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
346
Among the many, many potential sources discussing these costs and benefits, see generally
Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 639, 642 (1981); Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing
Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 484–87 (1986) [hereinafter McGovern, Toward a Functional
Approach]; Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 671–75
(1989) [hereinafter McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation]; Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic
Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative
Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347 (2000); RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A
WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional
Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369 (2008); J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the PostClass Action Era: The Problems and Promise of Non-removable State Actions in Multi-district Litigation,
5 J. TORT L. 1 (2014); Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV.
285 (2016).
347
See Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, supra note 14, at 10–19 (documenting
competing power centers in state opioid MDLs).
348
See generally, e.g., BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 3, at 18–19 (discussing the
appointment of “lead lawyers”); Burch, Monopolies, supra note 3, at 70–79 (proposing more competition
among MDL lead lawyers in order to balance out their monopolistic control); Burch & Williams, supra
note 3, at 1459 (explaining why “lead lawyers” in MDL are often repeat players). As an intermediate
form of consolidation outside of the federal MDL, state MDLs may also serve as a (limited) backstop
against the powerful federal transferee judge. If, for example, a federal MDL judge favors defendants too
much, later filing plaintiffs may attempt to plead their cases in ways that avoid federal jurisdiction. Or, if
the federal MDL judge makes both sides uncomfortable, the parties might even dismiss and refile cases
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the opioid litigation—with many lawyers from outside the federal MDL
leadership playing important roles in state opioid MDL proceedings.349 On
this issue, the variation in state MDL designs described above has an
unintended consequence. Because the methods of consolidating and
assigning state MDLs vary, it becomes challenging for the same group of
lawyers to win leadership contests in all of the proceedings.350 Or to put it
another way, enterprising plaintiffs’ firms that might not have the national
reputation to be selected to federal MDL leadership can maneuver into
leadership positions in one or more states. Once there, and armed with
effective control over an inventory of state cases, these lawyers can exert real
influence on the course of the overall litigation and potential settlement.351
To be sure, the more cases that flow into state courts and away from
federal MDLs, the more collective-action problems plaintiffs may encounter.
In that sense, state MDLs are no panacea. State MDLs may sometimes help
limit the agency problem in federal MDLs, but doing so may exacerbate
collective-action problems in litigation and may make it harder to obtain
global peace.352
E. Interjurisdictional Cooperation
Finally, alongside the potential for interjurisdictional competition, we
find that state MDLs may be sites for increased interjurisdictional
cooperation.
Some of this cooperation might be indirect. Because different states
employ different MDL procedures, there may be opportunities for
policymakers and judges to learn from each other. Indeed, we have found
evidence of state policymakers learning from each other and from the federal

in state court, with the defendants eschewing removal. Once there, the ability to use state MDL means
that the parties still may obtain some benefits of consolidation outside of the control of the federal MDL
judge. See Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, supra note 14, at 20.
349
See Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, supra note 14, at 8–10, 18–19.
350
We find this effect in opioids, too. See id. at 8–10, 14.
351
That said, competition between state and federal leadership runs counter to the cooperation we
describe infra.
352
We explore these tradeoffs in the opioid litigation in Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State
MDLs, supra note 14, at 11–17.
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system,353 and we have been told that state judges handling complex cases
are in communication about best practices.354
More directly, state MDLs can facilitate intercourt cooperation on
actual cases. In particular, we think that state MDLs can play an important
role when parties and courts want the benefits of consolidation while also
preferring or needing to be in state court.355
Imagine that a defective product leads to a federal MDL of 10,000 cases
plus 20 cases in each of ten states.356 Parties in those state cases may be
content to be in state court or may be stuck there because federal jurisdiction
is lacking, but they also would benefit from some coordination with the
federal cases and with each other. In simpler terms, coordination problems
are much easier to overcome when dealing with 11 proceedings than when
dealing with 201 proceedings. Consolidation of the state proceedings in state
MDLs reduces the nodes for coordination. More generally, if every state
consolidated all of their cases related to a federal MDL, no federal MDL
would face more than 50 satellite proceedings. Consolidation maximalists
353

See, e.g., supra Section II.A (recounting Texas legislative history referencing California and
Colorado MDL systems as potential models); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384, Committee Comment (“This rule is
new and is based upon Title 28, section 1407, of the United States Code, which establishes the procedure
in the Federal courts for the transfer of civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact,
pending in different districts, to one district for coordination or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”).
354
See Kuhl Interview, supra note 162. Another type of learning might be within the same litigation.
For decades, scholars and judges have observed that serial proceedings in mass tort cases—the process
of “maturation”—can help inform a global resolution. See McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach,
supra note 346, at 482–83; McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 346;
NAGAREDA, supra note 346, at viii. Spreading those across multiple courts or court systems may have
added benefits in this process. See, e.g., McGovern & Rave, supra note 320 (manuscript at 1–2, 16)
(disaggregating MDL proceedings into “spoke” jurisdictions “can increase the pool of cases eligible for
bellwether treatment”); Glover, supra note 346, at 25–42 (arguing that state court proceedings alongside
federal MDLs can produce “real-world data” relevant to the resolution of the federal cases); Lahav, supra
note 346, at 2387 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of informal discussions between judges in
aggregated cases and how such communication can make a global peace possible without class
certification); Cover, supra note 346, at 673–74, 678 (explaining the increase in innovation that is possible
with interjurisdictional communication).
355
We do not, for example, go as far as George Conway in his pre-Twitter days, who advocated for
amendments to § 1407 to allow the federal MDL Panel to consolidate cases in state courts if it so chose.
See George T. Conway III, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE L.J. 1099,
1107–12 (1987) (proposing that the federal MDL Panel should be authorized to transfer consolidated
cases to a single state court). Conway is more well known for his views on other topics. See George
Conway (@gtconway3d), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/gtconway3d [https://perma.cc/3VZ2-P4K8]. Nor
do we advocate for (or against) the adoption of an interstate transfer rule for related cases. See UNIF.
TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’NRS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1991) (providing, among
other things, for transfer between state court systems of related cases).
356
For the uninitiated, a federal MDL of 10,000 is unusual but not so rare. See Statistical Information,
U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/statistics-info
[https://perma.cc/A8G3-FFW8].
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might think that 50 satellite proceedings are 50 proceedings too many, but it
is a marked change from a world in which there could be satellite cases in
every state trial court around the country.
The opportunity for intermediate levels of consolidation may have
positive effects for parties and courts. State MDLs mean that parties may
obtain some of the benefits of coordination even when cases remain in state
courts. Indeed, states adopting MDL systems frequently did so in order to
obtain the benefits of coordination and case management.357 State court
coordination also allows state judges to remain active players in cases
involving state law without sacrificing all of the benefits of consolidation.358
And perhaps federal courts might be more willing to remand removed cases
that belong in state court because not all benefits of coordination will be
lost.359
Assuming that judicial cooperation is a good thing, then our analysis of
state MDLs suggests at least two things. First, if state MDLs improve
cooperation, then states adopting and amending MDL procedures could
realize those benefits by expressly providing that the existence of
coordinated proceedings in other jurisdictions should counsel in favor of
consolidation. And, indeed, New Jersey and New York currently do so.360
We also found that there are federal MDL counterparts to more than half of
the California consolidated products liability proceedings,361 and in 86% of
the products liability cases in Texas.362
Second, state and federal judges handling coordinated proceedings
could be encouraged to coordinate with one another. Federal MDL judges
routinely coordinate with state court cases, either by communicating directly
357

See supra Sections II.A, II.B. (describing the goals of the California and Texas systems).
Note that one criticism of federal MDL is that it thwarts the development of state law by imposing
flattened-out standards on multistate cases. See Samuel Issacharoff & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The
Hollowed Out Common Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 600 (2020); cf. Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on
Defendants’ Terms, supra note 88, at 1308–11 (observing that MDL can result in smoothing out of
differences in state law).
359
Note, too, that another criticism of federal MDL is that MDL judges sometimes sit on remand
motions in hopes of global resolution. See Clopton & Rave, supra note 14, at 20 (discussing this issue in
the opioid MDL).
360
See supra Section I.C.
361
Results on file with authors. Examples of pairs of overlapping California proceedings and federal
MDLs include: Abilify Prod. Cases, JCCP No. 4998, and In re Abilify (Aripiprazole) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
232 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (J.P.M.L. 2016); Zostavax Prod. Cases, JCCP No. 4962, and In re Zostavax (Zoster
Vaccine Live) Prods. Liab. Litig., 330 F. Supp. 3d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2018); Roundup Prods. Cases, JCCP
No. 4953, and In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741, 2020 WL 5865873 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 1,
2020); Onglyza Prod. Cases, JCCP No. 4909, and In re Onglyza (Saxagliptin) & Kombiglyze XR
(Saxagliptin & Metformin) Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2018).
362
Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 381–84.
358
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with state judges or by instructing counsel to coordinate with their state court
counterparts.363 This is a project worth encouraging, and state MDLs can help
do that. Simply by reducing the number of proceedings to coordinate, state
MDLs can facilitate these court-to-court efforts.364 In addition, because
institutional state MDLs can funnel cases to handpicked judges who might
have special experience in complex litigation, we might expect those courtto-court efforts to be even more welcome.365
To take just one example, in the Vioxx litigation, Judge Eldon Fallon,
who was handling the federal MDL, worked closely with well-respected
state judges Victoria Chaney and Carol Higbee. Judges Chaney and Higbee,
respectively, were handling the state MDL proceedings in California and
New Jersey.366 While we cannot say that state MDL procedures were
necessary for this coordination, it certainly helped that Judges Chaney and
Higbee had substantial masses of claims in front of them.
Or consider the opioid litigation.367 Nine states have consolidated
hundreds of state court opioid claims in state MDLs: California,368

363
For example, the JPML has a link on its website for “Multijurisdiction Litigation Guide -- Federal
and State Coordination,” see Legal Resources, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG.,
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/legal-resources [https://perma.cc/8UQZ-849X], and the Manual for
Complex Litigation takes up federal–state coordination as well. See infra note 364. For an example from
another area, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (under the influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law) empowers
bankruptcy judges “to communicate directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from,
a foreign court.” 11 U.S.C. § 1525; see UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, art. 25, para. 1 (U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L. (UNCITRAL) 1997), enacted
by G.A. Res. 52/158 (Dec. 15, 1997).
364
For example, state and federal MDL judges can even appoint the same lawyers to leadership
positions in both proceedings, as the Manual for Complex Litigation suggests. FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.225 (2004). But as we noted above, there are costs to
overlapping appointments as well. See supra Section III.D.
365
We do not mean to suggest that handpicking judges is all upside, but only that there may be
something to be gained from repeated interactions among state and federal judges handling complex
cases.
366
See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657, 2010 WL 724084, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb.
18, 2010); Susan Todd, Inside the Vioxx Litigation, NJ.COM (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.nj.com/
business/2007/11/inside_the_vioxx_litigation.html [https://perma.cc/G88H-DRNV].
367
For more detail on opioid cases in state MDLs, see Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State
MDLs, supra note 14.
368
See Cal. Jud. Council Coordination Proc. Log (on file with journal).
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Connecticut,369 Illinois,370 Massachusetts,371 New York,372 Pennsylvania,373
Texas,374 South Carolina,375 and West Virginia.376 These state-level
consolidations may be particularly important in dealing with the opioid crisis
because many of the plaintiffs are public entities. State MDLs create
opportunities for cooperation among courts and litigants without requiring
public-entity plaintiffs and state attorneys general, who might have a special
interest in remaining in state court, to submit to federal jurisdiction.377 And
we have reason to believe that many of the judges handling these state MDLs
have been in contact with and are coordinating with the federal MDL judge.
We hasten to remind readers that state MDLs are more than just
adjuncts to federal MDL. Although many large products liability disputes
have state and federal court components, there are many examples of
complex litigation that reside exclusively within the jurisdiction of a single
state court system. Our review of the California and Texas data confirms this
intuition. And especially in large states such as those, intercourt coordination
is important even when no other judicial system is involved. So, again, state
MDLs can be important sites of interjurisdictional cooperation, but they also
are important intrajurisdictionally as well.
CONCLUSION
In the decades since Congress adopted the federal MDL statute, more
and more states have adopted procedures to coordinate cases across state
courts. And there is some evidence that even more states might join their
ranks soon.

369
See, e.g., City of New Haven v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. X07HHDCV176086134S, 2019 WL
423990 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2019).
370
See People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., Order No. 123090 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2018) (on file with journal).
371
See, e.g., City of Bos. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884-CV-02860, 2020 WL 2198026 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2020).
372
See Order Granting Defendants’ Application to Coordinate Cases and for Partial Stay Pursuant to
22 NYCRR 202.69, County of Suffolk v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 613760/2016, 2017 WL 11421786
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 19, 2017).
373
See Delaware County v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 17-8095 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Mar. 26, 2018) (on file
with journal).
374
See MDL Pretrial Cause No. 2018-77098, Master File No. 2018-63587 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 6,
2019) (on file with journal).
375
See Am. Order RE: Opioid Litig. (S.C. Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.sccourts.org/
courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2018-08-23-01 [https://perma.cc/QHJ4-QAUU].
376
See Opioid Litigation, W. VA. JUDICIARY (Nov. 19, 2020), http://www.courtswv.gov/lowercourts/mlp/opioid.html [https://perma.cc/489Q-UQQF] (collecting documents).
377
See, e.g., Roger Michalski, MDL Immunity: Lessons from the National Prescription Opiate
Litigation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 175, 235–46 (2019) (arguing for an exemption from MDL consolidation
for cases brought by or against public litigants).
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This Article is not meant to be a paean to state MDLs, but rather an
acknowledgment that they play an important role in American complex
litigation and will continue to do so. Detailed and critical study of their
design and operation, therefore, will play an important role too.
APPENDIX A: STATE MDL RULES, STATUTES, AND STANDARDS
Table A1 provides citations to the statutes and rules creating MDL
procedures in the states. Table A2 provides the standards that institutional
and peer MDL states use to decide whether to consolidate cases.
TABLE A1: STATE MDL RULES AND STATUTES

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas

Category
None
None
None
None

California

Institutional

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

Institutional
Institutional
None
None
None
None
None
Institutional
Peer
None
Institutional
None
None

Maine

Peer

Maryland
Massachusetts

None
Peer

Michigan

Ad hoc

Citation
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 404–404.9 (West
2020); CAL. R. CT. 3.501–3.545
COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-347b (2019)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384
IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D)
N/A
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-242(c) (2014)
N/A
N/A
ME. R. CIV. P. 42; ME. STAT. tit. 14, § 508
(2019)
N/A
MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31
In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., Admin. Order
No. 2000-5 (Mich. 2000); In re Silicone Gel
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Category

Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Institutional
None
None
None
None
None
Peer
Institutional
None
Institutional
Institutional
None
None

Oklahoma

Ad hoc

Oregon

Institutional

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

Peer
Peer

South Carolina

Ad hoc

South Dakota
Tennessee

None
Ad hoc

Texas

Institutional

Utah
Vermont

None
None

Virginia

Institutional

Washington

None

West Virginia

Institutional

Wisconsin
Wyoming

Peer
None
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Citation
Breast Implants Litig., Admin Order No.
1993-2 (Mich. 1993)
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 113.03
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 12(b)
N.J. CT. R. 4:38A
N/A
UNIF. R. N.Y. STATE TRIAL CTS. § 202.69
N.C. GEN. R. PRAC. SUPER. & DIST. CTS. 2.1
N/A
N/A
In re Okla. Breast Implant Cases, 847 P.2d
772 (Okla. 1993)
OR. R. CIV. P. 32K;
OR. R. APP. P. 12.15
PA. R. CIV. P. 213, 213.1
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 42(a)
See In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig.,
503 S.E.2d 445 (S.C. 1998)
N/A
TENN. SHELBY CNTY. CT. R. 28
TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 74.161 et seq.
(West 2019);
TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13
N/A
N/A
VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 8.01-267.1 to 267.9
(2020)
N/A
W. VA. R. CIV. P. 42(b);
W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26
WIS. STAT. § 805.05(1)(b) (2020)
N/A

115:1649 (2021)

MDL in the States

TABLE A2: STANDARDS FOR CONSOLIDATION IN INSTITUTIONAL AND PEER STATE MDL

State

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Illinois

Standard for Consolidation
“Coordination of civil actions sharing a common question
of fact or law is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the
actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will
promote the ends of justice taking into account whether the
common question of fact or law is predominating and
significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties,
witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the
actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient
utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar
of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and
inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and, the
likelihood of settlement of the actions without further
litigation should coordination be denied.” CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 404.1 (West 2020).
“Transfer of civil actions sharing a common question of
law or fact is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the
actions will promote the ends of justice and the just and
efficient conduct of such actions. The factors to be
considered shall include, but shall not be limited to, the
following: (1) whether the common question of fact or law
is predominating and significant to the litigation; (2) the
convenience of the parties, witnesses and counsel; (3) the
relative development of the action and the work product of
counsel; (4) the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and
manpower; (5) the calendar of the courts; (6) the
disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings,
orders or judgments; and (7) the likelihood of settlement of
the actions without further litigation should transfer be
denied.” COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(g).
“[W]hen required for the efficient operation of the courts
and to insure the prompt and proper administration of
justice.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-347b(a) (2019).
“When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact or law are pending in different judicial
circuits, and the Supreme Court determines that
consolidation would serve the convenience of the parties
and witnesses and would promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions.” ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384(a).
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Indiana

Kansas

Maine

Massachusetts

1722

Standard for Consolidation
“When civil actions involving a common question of law
or fact are pending in different courts, a party to any of the
actions may, by motion, request consolidation of those
actions for the purpose of discovery and any pre-trial
proceedings.” IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D).
“When civil actions arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences are
pending in different judicial districts, the supreme court, on
request of a party or of any court in which one of the
actions is pending and upon finding that a transfer and
consolidation will promote the just and efficient conduct of
the actions, may order transfer of the pending actions to
one of the counties in which an action is pending.” KAN.
STAT. ANN. 60-242(c)(1) (2014).
“When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, in the same county or
division or a different county or division, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay . . . . In
making any order under this rule, the court shall give due
regard to the convenience of parties and witnesses and the
interests of justice.” ME. R. CIV. P. 42(a), (c); see also ME.
STAT. tit. 14, § 508 (2019) (“A presiding Justice of the
Superior Court may, in the interests of justice and to secure
the speedy trial of an action, or for other good cause,
transfer any civil action or proceeding from the Superior
Court in one county to another county. The Chief Justice of
the Superior Court may, in the interests of justice and to
secure the speedy trial of actions and the efficient
scheduling of trials, or for other good cause, transfer any
number of civil actions or proceedings from the Superior
Court in one county to another county. Transfer may also
be by consent of all parties to any civil action or
proceeding, provided that the prior approval of the Chief
Justice of the Superior Court is obtained.”).
“When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, in the same county or
different counties, it may order a joint hearing or trial of
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Minnesota

New Hampshire

New Jersey
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any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order
all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay.” MASS. R. CIV. P. 42(a); see
also MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31 (incorporating Rule 41(a)’s
standard by reference).
“When two or more cases pending in more than one
judicial district involve one or more common questions of
fact or are otherwise related cases in which there is a
special need for or desirability of central or coordinated
judicial management, a motion by a party or a court’s
request for assignment of the cases to a single judge may
be made to the chief justice of the Supreme Court.” M INN.
GEN. R. PRAC. 113.03(a).
“Whenever a Motion is filed in any county requesting the
transfer of an action there pending to another county for
trial with an action there pending, arising out of the same
transaction or event or involving common issues of law,
and/or fact, the court may, after notice to all parties in all
such pending actions and hearing, make such order for
consolidation in any one of such counties in which such
actions are pending, as justice and convenience require.”
N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 12(b).
“In determining whether designation as multicounty
litigation is warranted, the following factors, among others,
will be considered:
whether the case(s) possess(es) the following
characteristics:
it involves large numbers of parties;
it involves many claims with common, recurrent
issues of law and fact that are associated with a single
product, mass disaster, or complex environmental or toxic
tort;
there is geographical dispersement of parties;
there is a high degree of commonality of injury or
damages among plaintiffs;
there is a value interdependence between different
claims, that is, the perceived strength or weakness of the
causation and liability aspects of the case(s) are often
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New York

1724

Standard for Consolidation
dependent upon the success or failure of similar lawsuits in
other jurisdictions; and
there is a degree of remoteness between the court and
actual decisionmakers in the litigation, that is, even the
simplest of decisions may be required to pass through
layers of local, regional, national, general and house
counsel.
whether there is a risk that centralization may
unreasonably delay the progress, increase the expense, or
complicate the processing of any action, or otherwise
prejudice a party;
whether centralized management is fair and
convenient to the parties, witnesses and counsel;
whether there is a risk of duplicative and inconsistent
rulings, orders or judgments if the cases are not managed
in a coordinated fashion;
whether coordinated discovery would be
advantageous;
whether the cases require specialized expertise and
case processing as provided by the dedicated multicounty
litigation judge and staff;
whether centralization would result in the efficient
utilization of judicial resources and the facilities and
personnel of the court;
whether issues of insurance, limits on assets and
potential bankruptcy can be best addressed in coordinated
proceedings; and
whether there are related matters pending in Federal
court or in other state courts that require coordination with
a single New Jersey judge.” GLENN A. GRANT,
MULTICOUNTY LITIGATION GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA FOR
DESIGNATION (REVISED) 1–2 (2019); see also N.J. CT. R.
4:38-1 (providing for consolidation of actions).
“In determining whether to issue an administrative order of
coordination, the Panel shall consider, among other things,
the complexity of the actions; whether common questions
of fact or law exist, and the importance of such questions
to the determination of the issues; the risk that coordination
may unreasonably delay the progress, increase the expense,
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or complicate the processing of any action or otherwise
prejudice a party; the risk of duplicative or inconsistent
rulings, orders or judgments; the convenience of the
parties, witnesses and counsel; whether coordinated
discovery would be advantageous; efficient utilization of
judicial resources and the facilities and personnel of the
court; the manageability of a coordinated litigation;
whether issues of insurance, limits on assets and potential
bankruptcy can be best addressed in coordinated
proceedings; and the pendency of related matters in the
Federal courts and in the courts of other states. The Panel
may exclude particular actions from an otherwise
applicable order of coordination when necessary to protect
the rights of parties.” UNIF. R. N.Y. STATE TRIAL CTS.
§ 202.69(b)(3).
“Factors which may be considered in determining whether
to make such designations include: the number and diverse
interests of the parties; the amount and nature of
anticipated pretrial discovery and motions; whether the
parties voluntarily agree to waive venue for hearing pretrial
motions; the complexity of the evidentiary matters and
legal issues involved; whether it will promote the efficient
administration of justice; and such other matters as the
Chief Justice shall deem appropriate.” N.C. GEN. R. PRAC.
SUPER. & DIST. CTS. 2.1(d).
“Coordination of class actions sharing a common question
of fact or law is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the
actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will
promote the ends of justice taking into account whether the
common question of fact or law is predominating and
significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties,
witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the
actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient
utilization of judicial facilities and personnel; the calendar
of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and
inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and the
likelihood of settlement of the actions without further
litigation should coordination be denied.” OR. R. CIV. P.
32K(1)(b).
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Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

Texas

1726

Standard for Consolidation
“In actions pending in different counties which involve a
common question of law or fact or which arise from the
same transaction or occurrence, any party, with notice to
all other parties, may file a motion requesting the court in
which a complaint was first filed to order coordination of
the actions. Any party may file an answer to the motion
and the court may hold a hearing.” PA. R. CIV. P. 213.1(a).
“In determining whether to order coordination and which
location is appropriate for the coordinated proceedings, the
court shall consider, among other matters: (1) whether the
common question of fact or law is predominating and
significant to the litigation; (2) the convenience of the
parties, witnesses and counsel; (3) whether coordination
will result in unreasonable delay or expense to a party or
otherwise prejudice a party in an action which would be
subject to coordination; (4) the efficient utilization of
judicial facilities and personnel and the just and efficient
conduct of the actions; (5) the disadvantages of duplicative
and inconsistent rulings, orders or judgments; (6) the
likelihood of settlement of the actions without further
litigation should coordination be denied.” Id. 213.1(c).
“When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, in the same county or
different counties, the court may order a joint hearing or
trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV.
P. 42(a).
“[T]he judicial panel on multidistrict litigation may
transfer civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact pending in the same or different
constitutional courts, county courts at law, probate courts,
or district courts to any district court for consolidated or
coordinated pretrial proceedings, including summary
judgment or other dispositive motions, but not for trial on
the merits. A transfer may be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation on its determination that the transfer
will: (1) be for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses; and (2) promote the just and efficient conduct of
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the actions.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West
2019)
“On motion of any party, a circuit court may enter an order
joining, coordinating, consolidating or transferring civil
actions as provided in this chapter upon finding that:
1. Separate civil actions brought by six or more
plaintiffs involve common questions of law or fact and
arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences;
2. The common questions of law or fact predominate
and are significant to the actions; and
3. The order (i) will promote the ends of justice and
the just and efficient conduct and disposition of the
actions, and (ii) is consistent with each party’s right to due
process of law, and (iii) does not prejudice each individual
party’s right to a fair and impartial resolution of each
action.
Factors to be considered by the court include, but are
not limited to, (i) the nature of the common questions of
law or fact; (ii) the convenience of the parties, witnesses
and counsel; (iii) the relative stages of the actions and the
work of counsel; (iv) the efficient utilization of judicial
facilities and personnel; (v) the calendar of the courts; (vi)
the likelihood and disadvantages of duplicative and
inconsistent rulings, orders or judgments; (vii) the
likelihood of prompt settlement of the actions without the
entry of the order; and (viii) as to joint trials by jury, the
likelihood of prejudice or confusion.” VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-267.1 (2020).
“Two (2) or more civil actions pending in one or more
circuit courts: (1) involving common questions of law or
fact in mass accidents or single catastrophic events in
which a number of people are injured; or (2) involving
common questions of law or fact in ‘personal injury mass
torts’ implicating numerous claimants in connection with
widely available or mass-marketed products and their
manufacture, design, use, implantation, ingestion, or
exposure; or (3) involving common questions of law or
fact in ‘property damage mass torts’ implicating numerous
claimants in connection with claims for replacement or
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repair of allegedly defective products, including those in
which claimants seek compensation for the failure of the
product to perform as intended with resulting damage to
the product itself or other property, with or without
personal injury overtones; or (4) involving common
questions of law or fact in ‘economic loss’ cases
implicating numerous claimants asserting defect claims
similar to those in property damage circumstances which
are in the nature of consumer fraud or warranty actions on
a grand scale including allegations of the existence of a
defect without actual product failure or injury; or (5)
involving common questions of law or fact regarding harm
or injury allegedly caused to numerous claimants by
multiple defendants as a result of alleged nuisances or
similar property damage causes of action.” W. VA. TR. CT.
R. 26.04(a).
“When actions which might have been brought as a single
action under s. 803.04 are pending before different courts,
any such action may be transferred upon motion of any
party or of the court to another court where the related
action is pending.” W IS. STAT. § 805.05(1)(b) (2020); see
also id. § 803.04(1) (“All persons may join in one action as
plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally,
or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to
all these persons will arise in the action.”).

APPENDIX B: CALIFORNIA COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS DATA
As described in the main text, we collected and analyzed data on
petitions for civil case coordination disposed of between January 1, 2014 and
May 22, 2019. We report here our findings on the selection of judges and
courts.
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Coordination Motion Judges
During the five-and-a-half-year period covered by our dataset, 49
different motions judges granted 163 motions to coordinate.378 Table B1 lists
the coordination motion judges who granted 2 or more motions:
TABLE B1: COORDINATION MOTIONS GRANTED BY JUDGES

Coordination Motion
Judge

Motions
Granted

Coordination Motion
Judge

Motions
Granted

Emilie H. Elias

38

Marie S. Weiner

4

Carolyn B. Kuhl

14

William D. Claster

3

Ann I. Jones

10

Kevin R. Culhane

3

Curtis E.A. Karnow

9

Kenneth R. Freeman

3

David S. Cohn

6

George C. Hernandez

3

Thierry P. Colaw

5

Craig G. Riemer

3

Gail A. Andler

4

Glenda Sanders

3

Peter R. Kirwan

4

Mary E. Wiss

3

Eddie C. Sturgeon

4

Of the coordination motion decisions, 91 (56%) were made by female
judges and 72 (44%) by male judges. In 80 cases (49%), the chief justice
authorized another judicial officer to select the motion judge. In 37 cases
(23%), the chief justice selected a presumptive coordination motion judge,
unless otherwise directed by the court’s presiding judge.379 In the remaining
46 cases (28%), it appears that the chief justice assigned the motion judge
directly.380

378
One could study coordination motion judges who denied motions. Data for granted motions were
more easily collated, so we rely on this subset for our study here.
379
Data on file with authors. It is our understanding that this practice of judicial deference has
developed in conjunction with Los Angeles’s Complex Litigation Program. See Kuhl Interview, supra
note 162. The lead judge in Complex Litigation Program presumptively was the coordination motion
judge for Los Angeles cases. See Kuhl Interview, supra note 162; see also Complex Litigation Program
(Spring Street Courthouse), SUPER. CT. OF CAL., CNTY. OF L.A., http://www.lacourt.org/division/civil/
CI0042.aspx [https://perma.cc/ERR5-HHEB] (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (describing the responsibilities
of the Complex Litigation Program judges).
380
Data on file with authors. Of the motion judges selected by the chief justice, more than 80% were
female (67 of 83). Three-quarters of those appointments (62 of 83) went to three judges: Elias (38), Kuhl
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Transferee Counties
Coordinated cases during our period were assigned to seventeen
different counties. About 80% of cases were assigned to courts with
specialized complex litigation programs to handle complex civil cases.381 We
also inquired into the relationship between the county selected to hear the
coordination motion and the county selected to hear the consolidated action.
One judge reported the impression that the chief justice selected coordination
motion judges with an eye toward the coordination trial court.382 And, indeed,
in more than 80% of cases (133 of 163), the county selected for trial was also
the county selected for the coordination motion. In 30 cases (18%), the
motion was handled in a different county than the trial court.383 Table B2 lists
the counties that handled one or more coordinated proceedings:
TABLE B2: PROCEEDINGS COORDINATED IN TRANSFEREE COUNTIES

Transferee County

Coordinated
Proceedings

Transferee County

Coordinated
Proceedings

Los Angeles

63

San Mateo

4

Orange

22

Monterey

3

San Francisco

19

Fresno

2

Alameda

10

Contra Costa

1

Santa Clara

9

San Joaquin

1

Sacramento

8

Santa Barbara

1

San Diego

8

Solano

1

Riverside

6

Yolo

1

San Bernardino

4

(14), and Jones (10). Recall that the other appointments were made by presiding judges in the usual
manner in which cases were assigned.
381
Data on file with authors. See generally Wood et al., supra note 149 (providing an overview of
California’s complex court program).
382
See Kuhl Interview, supra note 162.
383
Data on file with authors.
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Trial Judges
During our period, 154 coordinated cases were assigned to 55 different
California judges.384 We also asked three questions about these judges (in
addition to partisanship, which is addressed in the main text). First, we
looked at whether the chief justice selected the trial judge directly or
delegated the task to the presiding judge to assign in the usual manner.
Assignment to the presiding judge was by far the dominant mode; in fewer
than 15% of cases was the trial judge selected directly.385 Second, we looked
at the relationship between motion and trial judges. Of the 154 trial judge
appointments, 62 (40%) were made to the judge who also served as the
coordination motion judge. Third, we looked at gender. Of the trial judge
assignments, 55 (36%) were to female judges and 99 (64%) were to male
judges.386 These results are almost perfectly on par with the overall pool of
California trial judges, which, according to a 2018 report, was 36.1%
female.387 Table B3 lists the judges who handled more than 2 coordinated
proceedings:

384
Data on file with authors. In the other nine cases where a coordination motion was granted, the
trial judge had not yet been selected or the information was otherwise unavailable.
385
We have data on this question for all 163 cases. In 139 cases, the presiding judge selected the trial
judge. In the remaining 24 cases, it appears that the chief justice selected the trial judge.
386
Data on file with authors. Among the cases assigned directly by the chief justice, though, female
coordination trial judges were assigned in 58% of cases (14 of 24).
387
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA, supra note 178. Race and ethnicity are more difficult to assess without
access to judicial records. Using publicly available sources, we were able to identify only eight
appointments to nonwhite judges, or about 5%. This is much lower than the percentage of nonwhite
California trial judges (31.6%). See id.
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TABLE B3: PROCEEDINGS COORDINATED BEFORE TRIAL JUDGES

Trial Judge

Coordinated
Proceedings

Trial Judge

Coordinated
Proceedings

Curtis E.A. Karnow

11

Mary E. Wiss

5

Elihu M. Berle

10

William D. Claster

4

Carolyn B. Kuhl

9

David S. Cohn

4

William F.
Highberger

8

Kim G. Dunning

4

Jane L. Johnson

7

George C.
Hernandez

4

Kenneth R. Freeman

6

Eddie C. Sturgeon

4

Amy D. Hogue

6

Gail A. Andler

3

John Shepard Wiley,
Jr.

6

Ann I. Jones

3

Thierry P. Colaw

5

Maren E. Nelson

3

Peter H. Kirwan

5

APPENDIX C: TEXAS MDL DATA
As described in the main text, we collected and analyzed data on all
Texas MDL proceedings. Our period spanned from the inception of the
Texas MDL system in September 2003 to October 2019. We report here our
findings on the selection of judges and courts. In addition, we reported in the
text our findings on partisanship and retransfer. The Tables and descriptions
in this Appendix are adapted from our article Texas MDL.388
Transferee Counties
Unsurprisingly, the Texas MDL panel has tended to create MDLs in
major population centers, like Harris, Dallas, and Tarrant Counties. But the
panel has also transferred MDLs to small counties like Orange County and
San Patricio County, each with fewer than 90,000 residents. Table C1 lists
the counties that were assigned 1 or more MDLs:

388

Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 380–89.
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TABLE C1: MDLS IN TRANSFEREE COUNTIES

Transferee County

MDLs

Transferee County

MDLs

Harris

23

Jefferson

2

Dallas

7

Webb

2

Hidalgo

7

Fort Bend

1

Tarrant

7

Montgomery

1

Travis

5

Orange

1

Bexar

3

Potter & Randall (jointly)

1

Galveston

2

San Patricio

1

Pretrial Judges
The Texas MDL panel has assigned 61 MDLs to 38 different pretrial
judges. The panel also retransferred MDLs to 5 additional judges. Table C2
shows judges who were assigned 2 or more MDLs (including retransfers):
TABLE C2: JUDGES ASSIGNED TWO OR MORE MDLS

Pretrial Judge

MDLs

Pretrial Judge

MDLs

Mike Miller

8

Dana Womack

3

Rose Guerra Reyna

5

Tracy Christopher

2

David Evans

4

Lonnie Cox

2

Sylvia Matthews

4

Mark Davidson

2

Daryl Moore

3

Jim Jordan

2

Robert Schaffer

3

Emily Tobolowsky

2

John Specia

3

Jeff Walker

2

Randy Wilson

3

R.H. Wallace

2

These numbers may overstate the degree to which the Texas MDL
Panel favors repeat players. Seven of Judge Mike Miller’s 8 MDLs were
related insurance claims stemming from Hurricanes Ike and Dolly. Four of
Judge Rose Guerra Reyna’s 5 MDLs arose out of severe hailstorms in South
Texas. Two of Judge David Evans’s and Judge Sylvia Matthews’s 4 MDLs
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apiece were related wind and hailstorm claims against State Farm, and
another 1 of Judge Sylvia Matthews’s MDLs involved claims against a
different insurer for the same wind and hailstorm events.
Texas law allows former or retired judges to continue to serve in a
judicial capacity under some circumstances.389 And Rule 13.6 of the Texas
Rules of Judicial Administration allows the MDL panel to appoint a senior,
former, or retired judge as an MDL pretrial judge, if that judge has been
approved by the chief justice of the Texas supreme court.390 The panel has
initially transferred MDLs to senior, former, or retired judges on at least eight
occasions. It has also retransferred MDLs to such judges an additional seven
times (sometimes, but not always, back to the same pretrial judge who was
handling the MDL before ceasing active judicial service).
We also considered the gender balance of transferee appointments.391
Roughly 28% of the pretrial judges the Texas MDL panel selected were
female and 72% were male. This represents a slightly smaller proportion of
female MDL judges than the current proportion of Texas district judges who
are women (37% as of September 2019).392
Finally, we observed that on three occasions, the Texas MDL Panel has
appointed multiple pretrial judges to hear related claims in a single MDL.
First, in In re Farmers Insurance Company Wind/Hail Storm Litigation
(Farmers I), the Panel transferred related cases against a single insurer
stemming from eight major storms over a two-year period to three pretrial
judges in three different districts around the state (Webb County, Tarrant
County, and Harris County).393 The three pretrial judges were tasked with
deciding all common issues together as a panel and all case-specific pretrial
questions as individual pretrial courts.394 The Texas MDL panel subsequently
389

See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.003(b) (West 2019).
TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(a).
391
We were able to identify gender based on publicly available sources. Race and ethnicity are more
difficult to assess without access to judicial records. Using publicly available sources, we were able to
identify only 10 appointments to nonwhite judges, or about 15%. This is roughly equal to the percentage
of nonwhite judges assigned federal MDLs in the prior study, see Clopton & Bradt, supra note 3, at 1737,
and much lower than the percentage of nonwhite Texas district judges (29%), see Profile of Appellate
and Trial Judges, TEX. JUD. BRANCH (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1444865/judgeprofile-sept-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYZ3-KJDW].
392
See id.
393
See In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig., 481 S.W.3d 422, 424, 425 n.4 (Tex. J.P.M.L.
2015); Order of Multidistrict Litig. Panel, In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig., Admin. Order
No. 14-0882 (Tex. Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=
062b7dcb-44b3-4408-848c-59a953fc99f8&coa=cossup&DT=DISPOSITION&MediaID=2d4080add78a-43a3-b2f9-b9b0f424a3b8 [https://perma.cc/G9XQ-P4LX].
394
Id.
390
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created a second Farmers MDL, Farmers II, for claims arising from storms
in the two-year period after Farmers I and transferred the cases to the same
three pretrial judges.395 In the third case, the panel transferred related oil and
gas royalty litigation to two different pretrial judges in the same county. 396

395

In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig. 2, 506 S.W.3d 803, 804, 807 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2016).
Order of Multidistrict Litig. Panel, In re Chesapeake Barnett Royalty Litig., Admin. Order No.
15-0113 (Tex. Feb. 14, 2019), http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=
7d358a5c-d139-4f4d-9573-d7c7198e7f9c&coa=cossup&DT=OTHER&MediaID=276a7687-73a14595-894a-c1b664dc9eef [https://perma.cc/93L2-Y62X].
396
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